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AMERICAN NATIONALS 
AND INTERSTITIAL CITIZENSHIP 
Rose Cuison Villazor* 
 
Citizenship scholarship is pervasively organized around a binary 
concept:  there is citizenship (which is acquired at birth or through 
naturalization) and there is noncitizenship (which accounts for everyone 
else).  This Article argues that this understanding is woefully incomplete.  
In making this argument, I tell the story of noncitizen nationals, a group 
referred to by this Article as American nationals.  Judicially constructed in 
the 1900s, and codified by Congress in 1940, American nationals possess 
some of the rights inherent to citizenship, such as the right to enter and 
reside in the United States without a visa.  Yet, they do not have the right to 
vote or to serve on a jury.  Thus, contrary to the usual binary framing of 
citizenship, the category of American nationals suggests that many people 
qualify as neither citizens nor aliens. 
Although American national status has existed for over a century, very 
little is known about how this status became part of U.S. nationality law.  
This Article aims to reverse this oversight by exploring the legal 
construction of noncitizen national status and its implications for our 
understanding of citizenship.  In so doing, this Article makes two 
contributions.  The first and primary goal of this Article is to complete our 
legal historical knowledge about how law has conferred and denied 
citizenship.  Specifically, this Article examines key congressional, judicial, 
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and executive actions between 1898 and 1940 that led to the creation of this 
liminal form of political membership for Americans living in the U.S. 
territories.  Second, this Article introduces two conceptual frameworks that 
flow from noncitizen national status:  interstitial citizenship and unbundling 
citizenship.  That is, American nationals disrupt the binary framing of 
citizenship by occupying the space between the citizen and the alien.  This 
liminal status, which this Article calls interstitial citizenship, reveals that 
citizenship is far more fluid than previously appreciated.  Moreover, this 
flexible form of citizenship suggests that the rights of citizenship may be 
unbundled.  Notably, both interstitial citizenship and unbundling citizenship 
have legal and policy implications for immigration reform. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The law of citizenship1 is typically framed as a binary concept.  There is 
citizenship (which is acquired at birth2 or by naturalization3) and there is 
noncitizenship (which accounts for everyone else).  Along this bright-line 
division, citizenship is typically considered the ideal status because of its 
attendant rights and benefits, including the right to vote,4 the right to run for 
office,5 the right to serve on a jury,6 the right to enter the United States,7 
and the right to remain in the United States without fear of deportation.8 
This dichotomous framing of citizenship, however, is woefully 
incomplete.  What has been overlooked is a different type of political 
category that, like U.S. citizenship, is also acquired at birth:  the noncitizen 
 
 1. The meaning and substance of citizenship is highly contested.  See generally LINDA 
BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN:  DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP (2006); 
ELIZABETH COHEN, SEMI-CITIZENSHIP IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (2014).  In this Article, I use 
the term “citizenship” to refer to formal citizenship or membership in a political community 
and the rights that flow to the individual based on this membership. See BOSNIAK, supra, at 
19 (stating that citizenship “designates formal, juridical membership in an organized political 
community”). 
 2. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that persons born in the United States and 
subject to its jurisdiction obtain citizenship); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 
693 (1898) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment, “in clear words and in manifest intent, 
includes the children born, within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of 
whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States”).  Individuals who are born 
abroad may also acquire citizenship at birth provided they satisfy the requirements set forth 
by statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (2012) (a child born abroad to two U.S. citizen parents 
acquires U.S. citizenship provided that one of the parents had a residence in the United 
States or one of its outlying possessions prior to the child’s birth); id. § 1401(g) (a child born 
abroad to one U.S. citizen parent and one alien parent acquires U.S. citizenship at birth); id. 
§ 1409(a)(1)–(4) (a child born abroad out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen father acquires 
citizenship if the child meets the conditions provided); id. § 1409(c) (a child born abroad out 
of wedlock to a U.S. citizen mother acquires citizenship if the mother was a U.S. citizen at 
the time of the child’s birth and if the mother was previously physically present in the United 
States or its territories for a continuous period of one year). 
 3. See id. § 1427 (outlining the requirements for naturalization). 
 4. See 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(1) (granting all qualified citizens of the United States the 
right to vote); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) (recognizing that all 
qualified citizens have a right to vote). 
 5. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (stating that the President of the United States must 
be a “natural born Citizen”); id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that a member of the House of 
Representatives must be “seven Years a Citizen of the United States”); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 
(stating that a Senator must be “nine Years a Citizen of the United States”). 
 6. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648–49 (1973) (“This Court has never held 
that aliens have a constitutional right to vote or to hold high public office under the 
Equal Protection Clause.  Indeed, implicit in many of this Court’s voting rights decisions is 
the notion that citizenship is a permissible criterion for limiting such rights.”); see also Foley 
v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978) (“[A] State may deny aliens the right to vote, or to run 
for elective office, for these lie at the heart of our political institutions.  Similar 
considerations support a legislative determination to exclude aliens from jury service.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 7. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 67 (2001) (recognizing that a citizen of the United 
States is entitled to “the absolute right to enter its borders”). 
 8. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (identifying the categories of noncitizens who are subject to 
removal from the United States); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284–85 (1922) 
(stating that citizens have the right to remain in the United States). 
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national (“the American national”).  As this Article explains, American 
national status occupies the space between citizenship and alienage and, 
thus, is a distinct category.  On the one hand, the law treats its holders, in 
some ways, as if they are U.S. citizens.  Having acquired American national 
status based on birth in a U.S. territory, American nationals owe allegiance 
to the United States and thus are recognized as members of the American 
polity.9  Indeed, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not apply 
to them because they are not “aliens”10:  they have U.S. passports and 
accordingly do not need visas to enter the United States.11  Additionally, 
American nationals are not subject to the deportation laws because U.S. 
territories are part of the United States. 
Yet, on the other hand, the law treats American nationals as noncitizens.  
By virtue of their alienage, they are ineligible to vote in federal, state, and 
local elections.12  They are unable to serve on a jury13 and bear arms.14  
Moreover, they are excluded from certain federal and state jobs.15 
Although millions of people who were born in U.S. territories acquired 
after the Spanish-American War of 1898—Guam, the Philippines, Puerto 
Rico, American Samoa, and the Virgin Islands—have held this status, very 
little is known about it.16  Far from a historical relic, noncitizen national 
remains the status of people who are born in American Samoa today.17  The 
2016 case of Tuaua v. United States,18 which upheld the constitutionality of 
 
 9. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (defining a national of the United States as “a person 
who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United 
States”); Sean Morrison, Foreign in a Domestic Sense:  American Samoa and the Last U.S. 
Nationals, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 72 (2013) (“Like citizens, nationals are part of the 
American polity, but they do not have all of the same rights and privileges.”); see also Tuaua 
v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 2d 88, 90 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 10. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (defining “alien” as “any person not a citizen or national 
of the United States”). 
 11. U.S. nationals may apply for “certificates of non-citizen national status.” See 
id. § 1452(b).  However, the U.S. Department of State has since declared that those eligible 
for a certificate should instead apply for a U.S. passport. See Certificates of Non 
Citizen Nationality, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal–
considerations/us–citizenship–laws–policies/certificates–of–non–citizen–nationality.html 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/CBE3-DUZC].  Nationals of the United States 
“shall not be issued a visa or other documentation as an alien for entry into the United 
States.” Documentation of Nationals, 22 C.F.R. § 40.2(a) (2011). 
 12. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978) (stating that “it is clear that a State 
may deny aliens the right to vote”). 
 13. See Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974), aff’d, 426 U.S. 913 (1976). 
 14. For a discussion of noncitizens’ ambiguous Second Amendment rights, see 
Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment:  Citizenship and the 
Right to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521 (2010). 
 15. Many public sector jobs require U.S. citizenship as a condition of employment, 
which has been found constitutional. See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 444–
47 (1982) (upholding a California statute requiring that all peace officers be U.S. citizens). 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. See infra Part I. 
 18. 788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that the Citizenship Clause did not grant 
birthright citizenship to American Samoans).  On June 13, 2016, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari, thus affirming the D.C. Circuit’s holding. Tuaua v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2461 
(2016). 
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American Samoans’ noncitizen national status, brought attention to this 
largely ignored political category.19  Media coverage of this case has shown 
extreme puzzlement over this unusual status,20 highlighting the need to 
explore further the legal and historical factors that led to the inclusion of 
noncitizen nationals in federal law and how this status impacts our current 
understanding of citizenship. 
This Article is the first of a three-part series that closely examines 
noncitizen national status and other liminal forms of membership and their 
potential to reframe our understanding of citizenship.21  In this Article, I 
make two specific contributions.  The first—which I intend to be this 
Article’s primary contribution—is to complete the legal historical account 
of how noncitizen national status came to be part of U.S. citizenship law.  
In particular, I bring to light the key congressional, judicial, and executive 
actions between 1898 and 1940 that led to the invention and codification of 
American nationals in U.S. nationality law.  Although scholars have 
examined the Supreme Court’s role in the construction of American 
national status,22 no one has examined how and why Congress codified the 
 
 19. Garrett Epps, Can the Constitution Govern America’s Sprawling Empire?, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 20, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/can–the–
constitution–govern–americas–sprawling–empire/421389/ [https://perma.cc/2PED-JHBT]; 
Noah Feldman, People of American Samoa Aren’t Fully American, BLOOMBERG:   
VIEW (Mar. 13, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016–03–13/people–of–
american–samoa–aren–t–fully–american (discussing the Tuaua case) [https:// 
perma.cc/9CLM-ZRL9]. 
 20. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Samoans’ Lawsuit Seeks Automatic U.S. Citizenship, WALL 
ST. J. (July 13, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230364400457752329 
1350498870 (discussing the Tuaua case and birthright citizenship in American Samoa) 
[https://perma.cc/L7G5-5PCL]; Last Week Tonight with John Oliver:  U.S. Territories (HBO 
television broadcast Mar. 8, 2015) (bringing awareness to the status of American Samoans 
through satire); see also Samoans Don’t Have Right to U.S. Citizenship, Court Rules, PBS 
(June 5, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/american-samoans-dont-right-u-s-
citizenship-court-rules/ (discussing the holding in Tuaua) [https://perma.cc/A2E4-5H4S]. 
 21. In embarking on this new research agenda, I aim to explore how law has constructed 
interstitial political categories such as American nationals, the implications of in-between 
lawful categories for our understanding of what it means to belong to the United States and 
whether law, as a normative matter, should continue to foster such intermediate categories or 
create a hard citizen/noncitizen line.  This Article focuses primarily on the legal construction 
and codification of American national status.  Other writing projects explore more deeply the 
contemporary implications of the concept of interstitiality and the various legal and social 
consequences of cultivating a nonbinary framework of citizenship law. 
 22. See generally Christina Duffy Burnett, “They Say I Am Not an American . . .”:  The 
Noncitizen National and the Law of American Empire, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 659 (2008) 
(exploring how overlapping legal traditions shaped imperialistic ideas in the United States, 
particularly the notion of the U.S. national); Frederic R. Coudert, Jr., Our New Peoples:  
Citizens, Subjects, Nationals or Aliens, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 13 (1903) (examining the 
noncitizen status of Puerto Ricans and Filipinos); Sam Erman, Citizens of Empire:  Puerto 
Rico, Status, and Constitutional Change, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1181 (2014) (exploring the 
history of U.S. national status as applied to Puerto Rico); Dudley O. McGovney, Our 
Non-citizen Nationals, Who Are They?, 22 CALIF. L. REV. 593 (1934) (explaining which 
people are considered noncitizen nationals and arguing that there is no reason to perpetuate 
the status); Ediberto Román, The Alien-Citizen Paradox and Other Consequences of U.S. 
Colonialism, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998) (describing the treatment of Puerto Ricans as 
inferior to U.S. citizens as the “alien-citizen paradox”); Donald S. Leeper, Recent Decisions, 
International Law:  Effect of Philippine Independence on Filipino Citizens Resident in the 
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status in the federal nationality code in 1940.23  Learning the codification 
process is important for gaining a fulsome appreciation of the contemporary 
statutory meaning of American national.  Importantly, through this 
historical discussion, I show that the story of American nationals is an 
overlooked story about racial exclusion from citizenship.  This history 
ought to serve as a guidepost for future discussion about varied forms of 
membership. 
Second, I call attention to two interrelated descriptive and theoretical 
concepts about citizenship that may be gleaned from American national 
status.  The first is a political category that I have coined “interstitial 
citizenship.”24 Analyzing cases involving American nationals, I describe 
the extent to which noncitizen nationals, as interstitial citizens, enjoy some 
rights of citizenship despite their technical noncitizen category.25  By 
occupying the interstices of the line between citizens and aliens, noncitizen 
nationals disrupt the citizen/noncitizen binary.  This disruption leads to the 
second theoretical concept.  Specifically, noncitizen nationals reveal that 
citizenship rights may be disentangled from formal citizenship and that 
 
United States, 50 MICH. L. REV. 159 (1950) (discussing the changing status of Filipinos).  
For further commentary on noncitizen national status, see Adam Clanton, Born to Run:  Can 
an American Samoan Become President?, 29 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 135 (2012) (discussing 
the unique citizenship status of American Samoans in the context of presidential eligibility), 
and Benjamin S. Morrell, Some More for Samoa:  The Case for Citizenship Uniformity, 9 
TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 475 (2014) (explaining that American Samoans are currently the only 
Americans born noncitizen nationals). 
 23. Only three (brief) articles have explored the Nationality Act of 1940. See Charles 
Cheney Hyde, The Nationality Act of 1940, 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 314 (1941); George S. Knight, 
Nationality Act of 1940, 26 A.B.A. J. 938 (1940); Note, The Nationality Act of 1940, 54 
HARV. L. REV. 860 (1941). 
 24. In a current project, which is tentatively titled “Unbundling Citizenship,” I more 
deeply explore the meaning of “interstitial citizenship” and “unbundling citizenship,” as well 
as the implications of these terms for contemporary immigration reform.  Another project, 
“Resisting Citizenship,” further expands on the disaggregation of citizenship rights and 
considers what it means that certain noncitizens have opted to reject citizenship.  Finally, in 
“Imposing Citizenship,” I explore the extent to which citizenship was foisted upon 
individuals and the implications of the imposition of membership for our broader 
understanding of citizenship. 
 25. To be sure, one account that may be told about American nationals is that their 
differentiated rights demonstrate their subordinated and second-class citizenship status.  
Indeed, the plaintiffs in Tuaua contend precisely this point. See Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 2, Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (No. 15-981), 2016 
WL 386730, at *18.  It should be noted, however, that the American Samoan government, on 
behalf of the American Samoan people, have rejected citizenship and opted to maintain their 
American national status. See Brief for Intervenors or, in the Alternative, Amici Curiae the 
American Samoa Government and Congressman Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, Tuaua, 788 F.3d 
300 (No. 13-5272), 2014 WL 4199267, at *23–35.  This Article does not quarrel with the 
Tuaua plaintiffs’ claim that American national status relegates these people to second-class 
citizenship.  Indeed, along with other constitutional law scholars, I submitted an amicus brief 
to the U.S. Supreme Court contending that American national status is an inferior political 
status that is questionable under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brief of Citizenship 
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Tuaua, 788 F.3d 300 (No. 15-981), 2016 
WL 860971, at *2.  However, in this Article, I am interested in examining a different way of 
looking at American nationals—as interstitial citizens.  Further, I do not see this framing as 
inconsistent with the view that American national status is an inferior form of political 
membership. 
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citizenship is far more fluid and malleable than its conventional framing 
suggests.  That is, citizenship may be unbundled.  Invoking the bundle of 
sticks analogy in property law,26 and drawing from legal scholarship on 
“unbundling,”27 as well as political scientist Elizabeth Cohen’s seminal 
work on “semi-citizenship,”28  I lay the foundation for my claim that the 
rights of U.S. citizenship may also be disaggregated.  I contend that this 
conception of citizenship has potential application to contemporary 
discussions on comprehensive immigration reform. 
Beyond this scholarly contribution, this Article tells the story of 
American nationals for larger normative reasons.  In particular, I contend 
that an examination of this neglected story deepens our understanding of the 
ways in which both Congress and the courts decided who should become 
full members of the American polity.  Thus, on a larger scale, narrating 
their experience helps to complete our legal, historical, and doctrinal 
understanding of the ways in which the law decides how citizenship may be 
acquired and to whom it may be denied.  I also show how American 
nationals navigated the terrain of their given citizenship status. 
The normative question of membership and citizenship is an ongoing 
contemporary debate, particularly in the immigration context.  Congress 
failed to enact comprehensive immigration reform in large part because 
political leaders could not decide whether to confer to undocumented 
immigrants a path to U.S. citizenship.29  Political leaders will inevitably 
 
 26. See, e.g., United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 274 (2002) (describing property rights 
as a “bundle of sticks”); Dow Corning Corp. v. Jie Xiao, 283 F.R.D. 353, 358 (E.D. Mich. 
2012) (same); Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 99 (2005) (same); Keith Aoki, No 
Right to Own?:  The Early Twentieth-Century “Alien Land Laws” as a Prelude to 
Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37, 39–40 (1998) (discussing bundle of rights in context of 
immigration law, citizenship law, and property law); David Bell & Jon Binnie, Sexual 
Citizenship:  Law, Theory and Politics, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND THEORY 167 
(Janice Richardson & Ralph Sandland eds., 2000) (discussing citizenship as a “bundle of 
rights”); Robert J. Goldstein, Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks:  Fitting Environmental 
Ethics and Ecology into Real Property Law, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 347, 385 (1998) 
(exploring bundled rights in an environmental context); Virginia Leary, Citizenship, Human 
Rights, and Diversity, in CITIZENSHIP DIVERSITY & PLURALISM:  CANADIAN AND 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 247 (Alan C. Cairns et al. eds., 1999) (discussing the notion of 
citizenship as a “bundle of rights”); Anthony Sammons, The “Under-Theorization” of 
Universal Jurisdiction:  Implications for Legitimacy on Trials of War Criminals by National 
Courts, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 111, 118 (2003) (applying property law’s “bundle of sticks” 
analogy to sovereignty). 
 27. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Unbundling Federalism:  Colorado’s 
Legalization of Marijuana and Federalism’s Many Forms, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1067 (2014); 
Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079 (2013); John 
Rappaport, Unbundling Criminal Trial Rights, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 181 (2015). 
 28. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 6 (discussing the concept of “semi-citizens” as people 
who have some but not all rights of citizenship and that citizenship rights may be 
disentangled).  Building on Elizabeth Cohen’s theoretical and more broadly analyzed work 
on “semi-citizens,” this Article shows how American nationals as “interstitial citizens” 
acquired certain rights typically associated with U.S. citizenship. 
 29. Compare Xavier Becerra, Immigrants Deserve a Path to Citizenship:  Opposing 
View, USA TODAY (Dec. 15, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/12/15/ 
immigration–reform–citizenship–editorials–debates/4034153/ (arguing that offering a path to 
citizenship “simply reflects our values”) [https://perma.cc/US2Q-D57A], and Roberto Suro, 
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have to address this unsettled question.  When they do, it would be useful to 
explore all existing lawful membership options and their potential 
application to the population of currently unauthorized immigrants.  
Ironically, emerging from the history of racial exclusion from citizenship is 
the potential for noncitizens to critically explore a form of membership that 
is short of citizenship, but one that might still work for them.  Ultimately, 
an examination of interstitial citizenship for undocumented immigrants 
might not be feasible or desirable, particularly given the inferior status of 
such citizenship.  Such conclusion might not be reached, however, without 
engaging in a comprehensive analysis of this possibility. 
The Article proceeds in five parts.  To understand the legal construction 
of the noncitizen national, it is important to situate it within the larger 
context of the framing of citizenship along the citizen/noncitizen binary.  
Part I emphasizes that this binary framing is itself a story about racial 
exclusion in which citizenship was historically primarily available to white 
individuals. 
Parts II and III explore how, despite the understanding of political 
membership along a strict citizen/noncitizen binary, a third type of 
category—the noncitizen national—emerged.  Part II examines the political 
and judicial decisions that inaugurated this novel status.  Having acquired 
territories in the early twentieth century, the United States deviated from 
previous practice of conferring citizenship to territorial inhabitants and 
chose not to grant citizenship to American Samoans, Guamanians, 
Filipinos, and Puerto Ricans, after they became subject to U.S. rule.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court subsequently handed down the Insular Cases,30 
strengthening the ambiguous status of these territorial residents as people 
 
Where to Go for Real Immigration Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2015), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/09/16/opinion/where–to–go–for–real–immigration–reform.html 
(arguing that “[t]o remain united, the United States can have only one form of citizenship,” 
but explaining that states are taking immigration reform into their own hands, offering 
different benefits for immigrants) [https://perma.cc/C7N6-9EHJ], with Aaron Blake, Why the 
GOP Should Follow Jeb Bush’s Lead on Immigration, WASH. POST (July 9, 2015), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the–fix/wp/2015/07/09/why–jeb–bushs–new–immigration–
stance–legalization–but–not–citizenship–is–a–smart–one/ (arguing that allowing legal status 
instead of a path to citizenship is the best option for the Republican Party) 
[https://perma.cc/F2NA-MBGF], and Editorial, Offering Permanent Legal Status a Good 
Step:  Our View, USA TODAY (Dec. 15, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/ 
2013/12/15/immigration–reform–citizenship–republicans–editorials–debates/4034151/ 
(arguing that legal status without citizenship, while not ideal, gives many undocumented 
workers exactly what they desire) [https://perma.cc/HK2N-MHYC].  
 30. The Supreme Court examined the application of the Constitution in the newly 
acquired territories in a set of cases known as the Insular Cases. See Dorr v. United States, 
195 U.S. 138 (1904); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 
182 U.S. 1 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 
U.S. 244 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901).  A recent case in Puerto 
Rico, in which the district judge rejected the application of the Supreme Court opinion in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), to Puerto Rico, has underscored the ongoing 
impact of the Insular Cases. See Conde Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla, 167 F. Supp. 3d 279, 283–
87 (D.P.R. 2016). 
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subject to U.S. jurisdiction without obtaining the status of U.S. citizens.31  
Part III explains the push for the country’s first comprehensive nationality 
law that culminated in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1940—in 
which it codified the liminal American national status in federal law.32  As 
this part reveals, the hearings preceding the adoption of national status 
highlight Congress’s ongoing quest to restrict citizenship along racial lines. 
Next, Part IV introduces two conceptual frameworks for understanding 
the law of citizenship, which I explore in greater detail in forthcoming 
work.  Contending that noncitizen nationals unsettle the law’s 
preoccupation with the citizen/alien binary, this part introduces the idea of 
interstitial citizenship.  Through an analysis of cases involving Filipino 
Americans when they were American nationals, this part explores how this 
intermediary form of membership shaped the lives of those individuals who 
are neither citizens nor aliens.  This part also explains how interstitial 
citizenship reframes our view of citizenship away from a binary 
citizen/alien paradigm toward a flexible conception of citizenship in which 
citizenship rights may be unbundled.  Further, it considers how both 
interstitial citizenship and the concept of unbundling citizenship may be 
useful in the current immigration reform debate on whether to provide 
undocumented immigrants with a path to citizenship. 
I.  THE CITIZEN/NONCITIZEN BINARY:  
A STORY ABOUT RACIAL EXCLUSION 
The traditional understanding of the law of citizenship divides 
individuals into two groups:  citizens and noncitizens.  In the United States, 
many sources contribute to this binary framework, including the common 
law, the Fourteenth Amendment, citizenship statutes, and naturalization 
laws.  The broad implication of this binary is simple from a formal political 
membership standpoint:  the citizen is one who belongs and the other one—
the noncitizen—is the stranger, the alien, or one who does not belong.33  
The distinction is critical because various laws treat citizens more favorably 
than noncitizens.34 
Given the more favorable status conferred upon citizens, it is important 
to understand the ways in which one may acquire U.S. citizenship.  Current 
law provides that citizenship may be gained by naturalization35 or at birth.36 
 
 31. See Toyota v. United States, 268 U.S. 402, 411–12 (1925) (holding that citizens of 
the Philippine Islands are neither citizens nor aliens); Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1, 13 
(1904) (holding that citizens of Puerto Rico are not “aliens”). 
 32. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137. 
 33. Despite this distinction, it is important to recognize, as Professor Hiroshi Motomura 
reminds us, that noncitizens should be treated as citizens in waiting. See generally HIROSHI 
MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING:  THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN 
THE UNITED STATES (2006). 
 34. See infra Part IV. 
 35. Congress first adopted a naturalization law with the Naturalization Act of 1790. See 
Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795).  The current statutory scheme for 
naturalization has its roots in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 
163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2012)), and the Immigration and Nationality 
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Citizenship by birth may be acquired through jus sanguinis and jus soli.  Jus 
sanguinis, “right of the blood,” refers to the acquisition of citizenship based 
on the citizenship of one or both biological parents, regardless of the place 
where the child was born.37  By contrast, jus soli, “right of the soil,” refers 
to the acquisition of citizenship based on the place of birth—that is, being 
born within the nation or its territorial possessions.38 
Importantly, the right to become a citizen, either by birth or by 
naturalization, is a story about racial exclusion from citizenship.39  As this 
part explains, citizenship is a status that, for a greater part of U.S. history, 
was accorded to white individuals only.  People of color, by contrast, were 
relegated to noncitizenship.  This background, more fully described below, 
provides the setting for the legal construction of noncitizen national status 
that is examined in Part II. 
A.  Common Law (Jus Soli) 
The concept of acquiring citizenship by birth stems from English 
common law.  Calvin v. Smith,40 a foundational case decided in 1608, held 
that persons born in Scotland—then within the sovereignty of the King of 
England—were English subjects.41  Since this case was handed down, the 
common law has recognized that any person born in any place within the 
sovereignty of England was a subject of the King at birth.42 
English settlers adopted the common law rule of jus soli in the colonies 
where it became the basis of territorial birthright citizenship for centuries 
until well after the founding.43  Yet, although the Constitution included the 
 
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.).  For a thoughtful background of naturalization’s place in American history, see 
generally ROGER DANIELS, COMING TO AMERICA:  A HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND 
ETHNICITY IN AMERICAN LIFE (2d ed. 2002). 
 36. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)–(f). 
 37. See Jus Sanguinis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 868 (7th ed. 1999); see also 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1401(g)–(h) (outlining the modern statutory conception of jus sanguinis). 
 38. See Jus Soli, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 869 (7th ed, 1999); see also United States v. 
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (solidifying jus soli as the governing law in the United 
States while also describing the historical and legal underpinnings of both jus sanguinis and 
jus soli). 
 39. For an extensive exploration of racial exclusion from citizenship, see IAN F. HANEY 
LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW:  THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996), EDIBERTO ROMÁN, 
CITIZENSHIP AND ITS EXCLUSIONS:  A CLASSICAL, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND CRITICAL RACE 
CRITIQUE (2010), Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold:  Race Discrimination and 
the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 18 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 3 (1998), Kevin R. 
Johnson, Race Matters:  Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law in the Ivory Tower, 
and the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 525, and Rose Cuison 
Villazor, The Other Loving:  Uncovering the Federal Government’s Racial Regulation of 
Marriage, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1361 (2011). 
 40. (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377. 
 41. Id. at 409–11.  For a thorough historical analysis of Calvin’s Case, see Polly J. Price, 
Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 73 
(1997). 
 42. See Price, supra note 41, at 73–74. 
 43. Both the federal and state governments conferred citizenship. See id. at 140 
(explaining that state common law and federal legislation governed citizenship law); see also 
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word “Citizen,”44 it did not specify how to acquire citizenship.  
Furthermore, Congress failed to pass legislation providing for territorial 
birthright citizenship.  To be sure, in the Act of 1790, the first naturalization 
law of the United States, Congress specified that children of “citizens of the 
United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the 
United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens.”45  Yet, that law 
focused on jus sanguinis, not jus soli.  Nevertheless, courts, including the 
Supreme Court, continued to rely on the common law rule to determine the 
status of persons born in the United States.46  In the case of Murray v. 
Schooner Charming Betsy,47 for example, the Supreme Court assumed that 
persons born in the United States were U.S. citizens.48 
The common law rule of territorial birthright citizenship, however, 
proved to be a rule that did not apply to all persons born in the United 
States.  In Dred Scott v. Sandford,49 the Supreme Court held that Dred 
Scott, a slave born in Virginia who sued for his freedom, was not a citizen 
of the United States.50  Specifically, Justice Roger Taney wrote that African 
Americans “were not intended to be included, under the word ‘citizens.’”51  
Praising the “great men” who wrote the Declaration of Independence and 
the Constitution,52 Justice Taney stated African Americans were considered 
“a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the 
dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to 
their authority, and had no rights or privileges.”53  In so holding, the 
Supreme Court deviated from the well-settled common law practice of 
conferring citizenship to persons born on U.S. soil or territory and flamed 
legal and moral questions that brought the country to a Civil War.54 
 
id. at 138–39 (discussing the impact the Calvin decision had on territorial birthright law in 
the United States’s early history). 
 44. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or 
a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be 
eligible to the Office of President.”). 
 45. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat 103 (repealed 1795). 
 46. See, e.g., Inglis v. Sailor’s Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. 99, 155 (1830) (noting that 
citizenship may be conferred by “birth locally within the dominions of the sovereign”); 
Kilham v. Ward, 2 Mass (1 Tyng) 236, 246 n.13 (1806) (reproducing, in a footnote, the 1805 
case of Gardner v. Ward, which stated that a “man, born within the jurisdiction of the 
common law, is a citizen of the country wherein he is born”); see also Price, supra note 41 
(examining cases utilizing the common law rule of territorial birthright citizenship). 
 47. 6 U.S. 64 (1804). 
 48. Id. at 120 (characterizing citizenship as available to one “born within the United 
States” or to one who “becom[es] a citizen according to the established laws of the 
country”). 
 49. 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
 50. See id. at 421–22, 426–27.  Because Scott was not a citizen, he failed to satisfy the 
diversity requirement of a federal lawsuit and, thus, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
case. See id. at 426–27. 
 51. Id. at 404. 
 52. Id. at 410. 
 53. Id. at 404–05. 
 54. See Ernesto Hernández-López, Global Migrations and Imagined Citizenship:  
Examples from Slavery, Chinese Exclusion, and When Questioning Birthright Citizenship, 
14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 255, 265 (2008) (discussing the impact of the Dred Scott 
decision). 
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The Court’s holding was perhaps unsurprising given that the institution 
of slavery treated African Americans as property.55  Additionally, the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Dred Scott, limiting birthright citizenship to 
whites, was consistent with federal law that similarly restricted the right to 
become a naturalized citizen to white noncitizens.  In particular, more than 
sixty years before Dred Scott, Congress passed the Act of 1790, which 
provided that a “free white person” who satisfies the residency and good 
moral character requirements, takes an oath, and swears to support the 
Constitution “shall be considered as a citizen of the United States.”56  Other 
than white immigrants, no other group of noncitizens was eligible for 
citizenship. 
B.  Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause 
After Congress adopted the Reconstruction Amendments57 following the 
Civil War, the U.S. Constitution for the first time specified how to acquire 
citizenship through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Specifically, the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause provided that “[a]ll persons 
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States.”58  In so doing, the Fourteenth 
Amendment overturned Dred Scott by affirming and constitutionalizing the 
common law principle of jus soli.59 
Yet the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment did not resolve all 
disputes regarding birthright citizenship.  In Elk v. Wilkins,60 the Supreme 
Court held that members of American Indian tribes do not gain citizenship 
at birth.61  John Elk, born in an Indian reservation, later left the reservation 
to live in a white community.62  When Elk registered to vote, the registrar 
rejected his registration, contending that Elk “was an Indian, and not a 
citizen.”63  Elk contended that he was in fact a citizen by virtue of the 
newly passed Citizenship Clause.64 
 
 55. See, e.g., The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864) 
(treating slaves as property of their owners and imposing criminal liability for failure to 
return escaped slaves). 
 56. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 104 (repealed 1795). 
 57. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII–XV. 
 58. Id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 59. See Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders:  Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the 
Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134, 2153 (2014). 
 60. 112 U.S. 94 (1884). 
 61. See id. at 103.  For a detailed overview and analysis of the case, see Saby Ghoshray, 
Rescuing the Citizenship Clause from Nativistic Distortion:  A Reconstructionist 
Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 261, 302–04 (2012), 
William M. Stevens, Jurisdiction, Allegiance, and Consent:  Revisiting the Forgotten Prong 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Birthright Citizenship Clause in Light of Terrorism, 
Unprecedented Modern Population Migrations, Globalization, and Conflicting Cultures, 14 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 337, 372–73 (2008), and Ashley E. Mendoza, Note, Anchors 
Aweigh:  Redefining Birthright Citizenship in the 21st Century, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 203, 
206–07 (2011). 
 62. See Ghoshray, supra note 61, at 302. 
 63. Elk, 112 U.S. at 96. 
 64. Id. 
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Finding Elk’s arguments unpersuasive, the Supreme Court held that Elk 
was not a citizen, because, by nature of his birth on an Indian reservation, 
Elk was not born “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” of the United States.65  
Relying on Justice Taney’s reasoning in Dred Scott, the Court articulated 
that the only ways to become a U.S. citizen are by birth or by 
naturalization.66  Indian tribes were alien nations, in spite of being situated 
within the territorial limits of the United States.67  Accordingly, members of 
the tribes born on the reservation “owed immediate allegiance to their 
several tribes, and were not part of the people of the United States.”68 
The Supreme Court later expanded on this connection between allegiance 
and citizenship in Minor v. Happersett.69  Examining the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court acknowledged that the original Constitution did not 
“prescribe who should be citizens of the United States or of the several 
States.”70  Yet, the Court underscored that “there were necessarily such 
citizens” even without those provisions.71  A nation “implies an association 
of persons for the promotion of their general welfare” and each one is 
considered a member of the nation.72  Notably, the Court stated that “[each 
member] owes it allegiance and is entitled to its protection.”73  The Court 
noted that, for “convenience,” the term “citizen” was used to describe this 
sort of membership.74 
Although the term citizen began to be used more regularly, the 
Citizenship Clause’s import, specifically as to people born in the United 
States, remained unclear.  It was not until 1898—thirty years after the 
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment—that the Supreme Court settled the 
question of whether birth in the United States led to citizenship.  In United 
States v. Wong Kim Ark,75 the Supreme Court addressed whether Wong 
Kim Ark, a Chinese man who was born in California to Chinese immigrant 
parents, acquired citizenship at birth.76  An immigration officer refused to 
 
 65. Id. at 102. 
 66. Id. at 101–02. 
 67. Id. at 99. 
 68. Id. 
 69. 88 U.S. 162 (1874). 
 70. Id. at 165. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 165–66. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. (“The object is to designate by a title the person and the relation he bears to the 
nation. . . .  When used [to describe one living under a republican government] it is 
understood as conveying the idea of membership of a nation, and nothing more.”). 
 75. 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
 76. Id. at 652–53; see also Patrick J. Glen, Wong Kim Ark and Sentencia Que Declara 
Constitucional la Ley General de Migración 285-04 in Comparative Perspective:  
Constitutional Interpretation, Jus Soli Principles, and Political Morality, 39 U. MIAMI 
INTER-AM. L. REV. 67, 73–81 (2007) (discussing Wong Kim Ark’s lasting effect on 
immigration law); Hernández-López, supra note 54, at 266–74 (providing background 
information on Wong Kim Ark and describing its significance); Richard T. Middleton, IV & 
Sheridan Widdinton, A Comparative Analysis of How the Framing of the Jus Soli Doctrine 
Affects Immigrant Inclusion into a National Identity, 21 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 521, 
526–28 (2012) (discussing the significance of Wong Kim Ark for modern citizenship law). 
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allow Ark to enter the United States following a trip to China.77  Claiming 
that his birth in California conferred U.S. citizenship upon him under the 
Citizenship Clause, Ark demanded entry.78 
The Supreme Court agreed with Ark and affirmed that he was a U.S. 
citizen under the Citizenship Clause.79  Acknowledging that prior to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, all white persons born in the United States, except 
for children of ambassadors or public ministers of foreign government,80 
acquired citizenship at birth, the Court explained that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s main purpose was to establish citizenship for African 
Americans and thus reverse Dred Scott.81  Yet, the Court explained that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s “broad and clear” words provided that all persons 
born in the United States, including persons of Chinese descent, acquired 
citizenship at birth.82  Thus, despite the passage of the Chinese Exclusion 
Act83 and other laws designed to prevent Chinese noncitizens from entering 
and remaining in the United States,84 Ark was a citizen and could not be 
excluded.85 
Although the Fourteenth Amendment opened up citizenship by birth to 
all persons, federal naturalization law continued to be quite restrictive.  
After the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress amended the 
Naturalization Law in 1870 to explicitly apply to “aliens of African nativity 
and persons of African descent.”86  In so doing, it excluded all other 
noncitizens, particularly Chinese laborers who came to the United States 
during the Gold Rush to work on the transcontinental railroad during mid-
nineteenth century,87 from acquiring political membership.  Indeed, 
Congress would not open up the naturalization law to immigrants who were 
not white or of African descent until the early 1940s.  While Congress 
extended the right to naturalize to Chinese in 1943,88 and to Filipinos and 
 
 77. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 653. 
 78. Id. (indicating that Ark believed he should be allowed reentry due to his status as a 
U.S. citizen). 
 79. Id. at 704. 
 80. See id. at 674–75. 
 81. Id. at 676. 
 82. Id. at 704. 
 83. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943). 
 84. See generally Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (upholding the 
deportation of Chinese noncitizens). 
 85. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 704. 
 86. Naturalization Act of 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256. 
 87. See generally Chinese Railroad Workers in North America Project at Stanford 
University, STAN. U., http://web.stanford.edu/group/chineserailroad/cgi–bin/wordpress/ (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2017) (providing electronic access to a myriad of source material including 
primary sources, contemporary periodicals, and multimedia presentations in addition to 
scholarly commentary on the history of Chinese rail workers in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries) [https://perma.cc/NB4U-97M9]. 
 88. Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, § 3, 57 Stat. 600, 601 (repealing the Chinese 
Exclusion Acts). 
2017] AMERICAN NATIONALS & INTERSTITIAL CITIZENSHIP 1687 
Indians in 1946,89 it was not until 1952 that Congress lifted all racial 
restrictions on citizenship.90 
Still, for those born in the United States, the Court’s ruling in Wong Kim 
Ark was intended to erase doubts about their status:  the Citizenship Clause 
mandated U.S. citizenship for this group.  But, as Part II describes, courts 
and Congress deviated from the Citizenship Clause’s command, as 
explained in Wong Kimg Ark, when they collectively created a new form of 
birthright membership status:  the noncitizen national. 
II.  THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN NATIONALS 
The year 1898, unlike others that readily evoke key events in American 
history, such as 1776,91 1964,92 or 2008,93 is relatively unheard of.94  Yet, it 
was a significant year for the United States because it marked the beginning 
of the American Empire.95  After defeating Spain in the Spanish-American 
War,96 the United States acquired several territories, including the 
Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam.97  That same year, the United States 
annexed Hawaii.98  Two years later, the United States expanded its borders 
 
 89. Act of July 2, 1946, ch. 534, §§ 2–5, 60 Stat. 416, 417. 
 90. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 311, 66 Stat. 163, 239 (codified 
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2012)). 
 91. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–
1789 (1998). 
 92. See generally ROBERT D. LOEVY, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964:  THE PASSAGE OF 
THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION (1997). 
 93. See JOHNNY BERNARD HILL, THE FIRST BLACK PRESIDENT (2009). 
 94. See generally Christina Duffy Burnett, The Constitution and Deconstitution of the 
United States, in THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND AMERICAN EXPANSION 1803–1898, at 181 
(Sanford Levinson & Bartholomew H. Sparrow eds., 2005). 
 95. See id. at 181–82; Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, History, Legal Scholarship, and LatCrit 
Theory:  The Case of Racial Transformations Circa the Spanish American War, 1896–1900, 
78 DENV. U. L. REV. 921, 921–22 (2001).  As scholars have noted, however, the United 
States had begun to acquire territories prior to 1898. See, e.g., Juan R. Torruella, The Insular 
Cases:  The Establishment of a Regime of Political Apartheid, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 283, 287 
(2007) (stating that the territories acquired beginning in 1898 marked the continuance of a 
nationalist expansion and manifest destiny period that began in 1783 after the Revolutionary 
War). 
 96. Pedro A. Malavet, The Inconvenience of a “Constitution [That] Follows the 
Flag . . . But Doesn’t Quite Catch Up with It”:  From Downes v. Bidwell to Boumediene v. 
Bush, 80 MISS. L.J. 181, 209–10 (2010) (“The Treaty of Paris, signed on December 10, 1898, 
approved by the U.S. Senate, and ratified by the president in 1899, officially ended the 
Spanish-American War, with the island of Puerto Rico as the United States’ prize.”). 
 97. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 756 (2008). 
 98. At the turn of the twentieth century, the “Native Hawaiian population had 
plummeted, its traditional . . . land structures had been replaced by Western models, the 
independent Kingdom of Hawai’i had been illegally overthrown, Hawaiian lands had been 
taken with neither compensation to nor the consent of the Hawaiian people, and Hawai’i had 
been annexed by the United States.” Jon M. Van Dyke, The Political Status of the Native 
Hawaiian People, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 96 (1998).  In 1993, Congress passed “[t]he 
Apology Resolution characterized the overthrow as ‘illegal’ and in violation of international 
law, and [it] acknowledge[d] that the United States had received the 1,800,000 acres of land 
‘without the consent of or compensation to the Native Hawaiian people of Hawai’i or their 
sovereign government.’” Id. at 102–03 (quoting Apology Resolution, Pub. L. 103-150, 107 
Stat. 1510, 1510 (1993)). 
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further by acquiring American Samoa through deeds of cession.99  With the 
newly acquired territories of Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Guam, and 
American Samoa, the United States’s population grew by more than eight 
million.100  The extension of sovereignty over noncontiguous lands,101 
inhabited primarily by people of color,102 stirred up novel constitutional 
questions, including whether these territorial residents acquired U.S. 
citizenship. 
This part identifies some of the central events between 1898 and 1940 
that led to the legal construction and federal codification of American 
national status.  As this part emphasizes, noncitizen national status is part of 
a larger story about racial exclusion from citizenship on the same 
constitutional and statutory grounds that Part I analyzed.  To be sure, today, 
American nationals who attain such status based on birth in American 
Samoa are now eligible for naturalization.103  Yet, as the Tuaua plaintiffs’ 
challenge to their American national status demonstrates, this status should 
still be viewed as the legacy of this forgotten part of our racial history.  
 
 99. See Rose Cuison Villazor, Blood Quantum Land Laws and the Race Verses Political 
Identity Dilemma, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 801, 826 (2008). 
 100. The population of the Philippines around 1900 was approximately 7,600,000. See 
Aurora E. Perez, The Growth of Population, in POPULATION OF THE PHILIPPINES 1, 5 
(Mercedes B. Concepcion ed., 1977); see also Cesar J. Ayala & Laird W. Bergad, Rural 
Puerto Rico in the Early Twentieth Century Reconsidered:  Land and Society, 1899–1915, 
37 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 1, 75 (2002) (noting that the “population rose by 17 percent from 
953,000 to 1,118,000” from 1899 to 1910).  As for Guam, the population in 1901 was 9,676 
people. See Gary J. Wiles, The Status of Fruit Bats on Guam, 41 PAC. SCI. 148, 149 (1987) 
(“Guam’s human population has grown dramatically since the turn of the century, increasing 
from 9,700 residents in 1901.”).  American Samoa’s population was approximately 5,000 
people. See Andrew Kent, Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court’s Misreading of the 
Insular Cases, 97 IOWA L. REV. 101, 169 (2011).  The United States also acquired the 
Panama Canal Zone in 1903, see Convention Between the United States and the Republic of 
Panama for the Construction of a Ship Canal to Connect the Waters of the Atlantic and 
Pacific Oceans, U.S.-Pan., Nov. 18, 1903, 33 Stat. 2234, which had a population of 75,000. 
See NEW INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK:  A COMPENDIUM OF THE WORLD’S PROGRESS 530, 594 
(Frank Moore Colby & Allen Leon Churchill eds., 1909).  There were approximately 8.8 
million African Americans in 1900, see U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE ECON. AND STATISTICS 
ADMIN., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, WE THE AMERICANS:  BLACKS 2 (1993), 503,000 estimated 
Latinos, see Brian Gratton and Myron Gutmann, Hispanics in the United States, 1850–1900, 
Estimates of Population Size and National Origin, 33 HIST. METHODS 137, 142 tbl. 2 (2000), 
114,000 Asians, see MICHAEL H. HUNT & STEVEN I. LEVINE, ARC OF EMPIRE:  AMERICA’S 
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From a normative perspective, uncovering this part of our citizenship 
history is important for filling in the holes in our American legal 
consciousness about how law determines who may receive political 
membership. 
A.  The American Empire:  
No Citizenship for U.S. Territorial Residents 
Under Article IV of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the power to 
“make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to the United States.”104  Inhabitants of territories 
acquired by the United States, whether they liked it or not, were thus 
beholden to Congress for any rights acquired as a result of their territory’s 
annexation.  Through treaties formalizing the annexation of territories, 
Congress articulated what rights would be conferred onto territorial 
residents.105 
Congress’s treatment of the territories acquired at the turn of the 
twentieth century departed from how it had treated the territories obtained 
prior to 1898 in at least one way:  Congress elected not to confer citizenship 
on the residents of the Spanish-American War conquests.  The territories 
acquired prior to 1898 were viewed as those that would eventually become 
states, which resulted in Congress providing an opportunity for such 
residents to acquire citizenship either by treaty or congressional act.106  For 
example, under the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo of 1848, which led to the 
annexation of New Mexico, Utah, and California, Congress provided the 
opportunity to the residents of those territories (and ensuing states) to either 
keep their Mexican citizenship or become U.S. citizens.107  Similarly, when 
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the United States annexed Hawaii,108 Congress ensured that residents would 
gain U.S. citizenship.109 
In contrast, residents of the territories acquired through annexation in 
1898 did not obtain U.S. citizenship.  Under the Treaty of Paris that the 
United States signed with Spain, the United States provided that “the civil 
and political status of the native inhabitants . . . shall be determined by 
Congress.”110  It further made clear that territorial residents could not retain 
their Spanish citizenship and allegiance to Spain.111  Instead, the treaty 
explained that the annexation of these territories meant that the people held 
allegiance to the United States and were under the country’s protection.112  
Importantly, it stated that, “the nationality of the island became American 
instead of Spanish.”113  By not conferring U.S. citizenship on the territorial 
residents, but recognizing them as American nationals, the treaty left it to 
Congress to decide the precise membership status of the residents that were 
now under U.S. jurisdiction. 
While Congress subsequently passed laws addressing this citizenship 
question, it did so in ways that left the status ambiguous.  On April 12, 
1900, it enacted legislation to define the citizenship of Puerto Ricans.114  
Yet, instead of conferring U.S. citizenship, the law stated that the 
“inhabitants of Porto Rico” were to be deemed “citizens of Porto Rico.”115  
Congress followed the same approach with the Philippines when it passed 
the Act of July 1, 1902.116  It provided that all inhabitants continuing to 
reside in the former Spanish colonies who had been Spanish subjects on 
April 11, 1899, and then resided in the Philippines with any children born 
subsequently, “shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine 
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States.”117  
Although Congress did not pass legislation specifying Guamanians’ 
citizenship status, these people were considered “citizens of Guam.”118 
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These laws, when combined with the Treaty of Paris, put forth a 
membership status distinct from U.S. citizenship.  For the first time since 
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress introduced a new type 
of political membership:  American national status.  The inhabitants of 
these territories now had American nationality but territorial, not U.S., 
citizenship, which left their status in between the citizen and the alien.119 
B.  The Insular Cases and Territorial Residents 
as Not “Aliens” 
Territorial residents’ new status as both American nationals and citizens 
of their territories marked the legal construction of noncitizen nationals, 
which culminated in the Supreme Court’s recognition of this status in the 
Insular Cases.  Previously underexplored in legal scholarship, the Insular 
Cases and their import in constitutional law and U.S. history have more 
recently received the attention that they deserve.120  Decided between 1901 
and 1922, the Insular Cases addressed the question of whether the 
Constitution applied to the newly acquired territories.121  The question, 
which had not before surfaced in relation to other acquired territories, led to 
the “territorial incorporation doctrine.”122  Under this doctrine, the 
Constitution applied in full force only in territories headed for statehood.123  
By contrast, only fundamental rights were protected in territories that were 
not on a path to statehood.124 
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Scholars have long noted the racial underpinnings of the territorial 
incorporation doctrine.125  For instance, in Downes v. Bidwell,126 the Court 
addressed the question of whether Congress acted within its power when it 
provided a temporary civil government and revenue for Puerto Rico, a 
territory that had recently been acquired.127  The Court recognized that the 
U.S. government’s “Anglo-Saxon principles” may not be ideal for newly 
acquired territories.128  Specifically, the Court reasoned that the 
administration of government and justice, according to Anglo-Saxon 
principles, “may for a time be impossible”129 because newly acquired 
territories were inhabited by “alien races” whose perspectives differed from 
the U.S. government’s Anglo-Saxon perspective.130  Ultimately, the Court 
held that if Congress was not ready to construct a complete government for 
a newly acquired territory, then it may construct a temporary government 
unbound by the restrictions of the Constitution.131 
Given Congress’s failure to confer U.S. citizenship on territorial 
residents—instead according them with American nationality status while 
simultaneously recognizing their allegiance to the United States—it was 
inevitable that the question of their political status would reach the courts.  
In Gonzales v. Williams,132 the Supreme Court examined the issue of 
whether Puerto Ricans were U.S. citizens but elected not to address it 
directly.  More than two decades later, in Toyota v. United States,133 the 
Court failed again to provide a definitive answer, thus solidifying the 
ambiguous status of American nationals. 
1.  Gonzales v. Williams 
Isabella Gonzales, a Puerto Rican woman, arrived in New York on 
August 24, 1902.134  Despite the United States annexing Puerto Rico a few 
years earlier,135 immigration officers barred Gonzales from entering the 
United States.136  Citing the Immigration Act of 1891, the immigration 
officers found Gonzales, an unwed pregnant woman, inadmissible on the 
grounds that she was an “alien immigrant” likely to be a public charge.137  
Although Gonzales insisted that the Immigration Act should not apply to 
her because of her status as a U.S. citizen,138 the immigration officers 
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nevertheless contended that Puerto Ricans were noncitizens and placed her 
in the custody of the Immigration Commissioner of the Port of New 
York.139 
It is fitting that the question of Puerto Ricans’ citizenship was addressed 
in the context of immigration law and, specifically, through the lens of an 
exclusion case.  Immigration, after all, is the body of law that determines 
who may enter the United States, who may stay, and who may be excluded 
from the country.  However, immigration law’s ability to exclude applies 
only to noncitizens.  Citizens, on the other hand, may not be denied entry 
from their country.  This citizen/noncitizen distinction, when viewed in 
conjunction with the indeterminate space occupied by Puerto Ricans as 
American nationals, complicated the immigration officers’ action in 
Gonzales; if American nationals were equivalent to U.S. citizens, then 
Gonzales would not need to seek “admission” to her home country and 
could not otherwise be denied entry.  While Puerto Rico was already part of 
the United States, the immigration officers nevertheless treated Gonzales as 
if she were an immigrant seeking admission and thus denied her entry and 
detained her.140 
As Professors Christina Duffy Ponsa and Sam Erman have examined,141 
the question in the Gonzales case pitted various groups against each other:  
those who wanted to consider Puerto Ricans noncitizens, those who sought 
citizenship for Puerto Ricans, and those who suggested that Puerto Ricans 
were neither citizens nor aliens.142  Drawing from these camps, Gonzales’s 
lawyer made two arguments contending that the Immigration Act of 1891 
should not apply to her:  Gonzales was a U.S. citizen or, in the alternative, 
Gonzales should not be considered an alien but rather a “national,” a new 
form of status.143  Relying on international law, Gonzales’s lawyer 
contended that the term “national” also connoted that the individual was a 
“subject.”144  By contrast, the government argued that she was not a citizen 
and that even if the Court were to accept the term “national,” Gonzales was 
still an alien subject to deportation.145  The resident commissioner of Puerto 
Rico, Federico Degetau, submitted an amicus brief contending that 
Gonzales and all Puerto Ricans became U.S. citizens when Puerto Rico 
became a U.S. territory.146 
Instead of directly addressing whether Gonzales, as a Puerto Rican, was a 
citizen, the Supreme Court analyzed whether Gonzales was an alien and 
thus subject to the deportation grounds.147  In finding that Gonzales was not 
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an alien, the Court articulated what it meant to be a noncitizen:  the Court 
noted that Congress had not intended to render Puerto Ricans noncitizens, 
thus denying them the right of free access to their own country.148  This 
emphasis on the right of Puerto Ricans to not be excluded is particularly 
evident when juxtaposed against the Court’s reference to the right of the 
United States to exclude noncitizens, such as Chinese laborers.149  
Similarly, the Court distinguished Puerto Ricans, such as Gonzales, from 
“foreigners . . . owing allegiance to a foreign government.”150  Thus, 
although the Court did not address whether Gonzales was a U.S. citizen, it 
declared that she was not a noncitizen.  With this holding, the Court 
avoided equating American national status with citizenship. 
By focusing on Gonzales’s noncitizen status and refusing to directly 
address whether Gonzales was a citizen, the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Gonzales was consistent with the Insular Cases.  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court explicitly relied on Downes in reaching its conclusion that Gonzales 
was not a noncitizen.  Underscoring that the Court held in Downes that 
Puerto Rico “ceased to be a foreign country within the meaning of the tariff 
act”151 and thus, the Customs Administrative Act was not implicated, the 
Court similarly held that the Commissioner did not have jurisdiction over 
Gonzales because, as someone who was not an alien, she was not subject to 
the immigration act.152 
2.  Toyota v. United States 
More than twenty years later, the Supreme Court faced another case 
implicating noncitizen nationals.  Unlike the Gonzales Court’s focus on 
Gonzales’s exclusion under immigration law, the Court in Toyota analyzed 
the denial of a noncitizen from acquiring U.S. citizenship.153  While the 
citizenship claim in Toyota did not involve an American national, the 
Court’s opinion included language that further indicated that American 
nationals were in fact not U.S. citizens. 
As discussed in Part I, the right to naturalize was a privilege afforded to 
white immigrants in 1790,154 and it was not until 1870155 when Congress 
extended this right to “aliens of African nativity and to persons of African 
descent.”156  During this time, the Supreme Court solidified these racial 
restrictions in Ozawa v. United States157 and United States v. Bhagat Singh 
Thind158 when it held that a Japanese man and a “high-caste Hindu” were 
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not “white” for purposes of the naturalization laws.159  Congress created an 
exception to this racially binary rule in 1918 when it afforded Filipinos who 
had served in the military the opportunity to naturalize.160  It was not until 
1943 that Congress began allowing immigrants from select Asian 
countries—Chinese, Indian, and Filipino citizens—to apply for 
citizenship.161  Congress finally lifted all racial restrictions to naturalization 
in 1952.162 
These naturalization restrictions, in conjunction with racially restrictive 
inadmissibility laws, were designed to limit Asians from immigrating to the 
United States.163  Indeed, Congress’s desire to exclude Asians first 
manifested in 1875 with the passage of the Page Act of 1875,164 aimed at 
Chinese women,165 and was thereafter extended to all Chinese laborers with 
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.166  Then Congress passed the 
Immigration Act of 1917 to widen the Chinese Exclusion Act’s scope to 
include additional racial immigrant groups.167  Japanese citizens were 
exempted from this exclusion under the “Gentlemen’s Agreement,” in 
which the Japanese government agreed to restrict Japanese nationals’ ability 
to migrate out of Japan.168  Yet, in 1924, Congress superseded the 
Gentlemen’s Agreement by rendering inadmissible noncitizens who were 
ineligible for citizenship.169  These racially restrictive naturalization laws, 
and the Immigration Act of 1924, meant that only noncitizens who were 
white or of African ancestry were eligible to enter the United States.170 
Against this backdrop, the Court in Toyota faced the question of whether 
a Japanese man was entitled to naturalize.  Hidemitsu Toyota, born in 
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Japan, immigrated to the United States in 1913.171  Unlike other Asians, 
Toyota, a Japanese national, was able to enter the United States because 
formal exclusions of Japanese nationals would not take place until over ten 
years later in 1924.172  Between 1913 and 1923, Toyota served in the Coast 
Guard and served in World War I.173  He received honorable discharges at 
least eight times.174  Despite racial restrictions on naturalization,175 Toyota 
applied for naturalization on May 14, 1921.176  He did so under two laws 
that he argued made him eligible for citizenship.  First, section 4 of the 
Immigration Act of 1918 allowed “any native-born Filipino” or “any alien” 
serving in the forces of the United States “during the time this country is 
engaged in the present war” to apply for naturalization.177  Second, the Act 
of 1919 extended the benefits of section 4 of the 1918 Act to any person of 
foreign birth who had been honorably discharged.178  Thus, Toyota, as a 
noncitizen who had served in the military during wartime, believed that he 
was eligible to apply for citizenship, and filed his application with the 
district court, which approved it.179 
The federal government, however, submitted a petition to cancel his 
certificate.180  Specifically, the government argued that Toyota was not 
eligible because the naturalization laws, with some exceptions for Filipinos 
who served in the military, only allowed whites and persons of African 
ancestry to naturalize.181  Furthermore, the government contended that 
courts had held that the Japanese were racially ineligible for citizenship,182 
and thus Toyota’s naturalization should be cancelled despite his military 
service.  The district court agreed with the government and canceled 
Toyota’s certificate of naturalization.183 
The Supreme Court, affirming the revocation of Toyota’s naturalization, 
held that he was not entitled to citizenship.184  Engaging in statutory 
analysis, the Court recognized that Congress had passed laws that enabled 
noncitizens who had served in the military to apply for naturalization.185  
As the Court explained, “a principal purpose of [the 1918 and 1919 Acts] 
was to facilitate the naturalization of service men of the classes 
specified.”186  Yet, the Court also noted that the passage of these laws did 
not affect any of the racial restrictions to citizenship that had been in place 
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under section 2169 of the Revised Statutes.187  That is, the Immigration Act 
of 1918, according to the Court, explicitly stated that “nothing in the act 
shall repeal or in any way enlarge § 2169” except for the provisions 
allowing for Filipinos or Puerto Ricans who were eligible to apply for 
naturalization because of military service.188  Although the Immigration Act 
of 1918 enlarged the class of noncitizens eligible for naturalization, the 
Court noted that it also “indicate[d] a purpose not to eliminate all 
distinctions based on color and race so long continued in the naturalization 
laws.”189  Indeed, the Court declared that only “native-born Filipinos of 
whatever color or race,” who had the requisite military service 
qualifications, were eligible for naturalization under the Act of 1918.190  
Thus, Filipinos who did not satisfy the military requirements under the 
Immigration Act of 1918 continued to be ineligible for naturalization 
because of racial restrictions.191  The fact that some Filipinos were eligible 
for naturalization demonstrated that they were not U.S. citizens. 
Although the Supreme Court declared that Filipinos were not U.S. 
citizens, it explained that they were not aliens either.  Indeed, the Court 
noted that their nonalienage was another reason why Filipinos who lacked 
military service were not eligible for naturalization.  Specifically, the Court 
held that the naturalization statutes applied to noncitizens—“all persons not 
citizens who owe permanent allegiance to the United States” and thus not 
applicable to Filipinos because “the citizens of the Philippine Islands are 
not aliens.”192  Alienage presumes that an individual owes permanent 
allegiance to a foreign country.193  As a territory of the United States, the 
Philippines, similar to Puerto Rico, was not a foreign territory and, indeed, 
fell under the “protection of the United States.”194  Thus, Filipinos “owe no 
allegiance to any foreign government.”195  Accordingly, the Court held that 
Filipinos are “not eligible for naturalization under § 2169 because [they are] 
not aliens.”196 Their nonalienage allowed them entry to the United States.  
However, they will continue to be barred from citizenship because of their 
race and American national status.  Whereas the Gonzales Court had held 
that American nationals are not “aliens,” the Toyota Court indicated that 
they are not citizens either.  These two holdings judicially solidified the 
ambiguous status of American nationals as neither citizens nor aliens. 
III.  CODIFICATION OF NONCITIZEN NATIONAL STATUS 
By the turn of the twentieth century, the ambiguous position of 
noncitizen national status was embedded in the country’s citizenship law, 
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primarily through the Supreme Court’s holdings in Gonzales and Toyota.  
These opinions did more than launch a new form of political category.  
They also added to the body of citizenship law that invoked racial 
ideologies in determining citizenship eligibility, both descriptively and 
normatively.  Further, the Court inserted yet another rule to a growing list 
of citizenship laws scattered in various parts of federal law.  Congress, 
tasked with the power to establish a “uniform rule of naturalization,”197 
could have avoided these dispersed citizenship laws.  Yet, between 1790—
when Congress passed the first naturalization law198—and 1940, Congress 
enacted laws concerning citizenship, whether by birth or naturalization, that 
were dispersed throughout more than fifty different statutes.199  
Administrative officers and judges often experienced difficulty 
implementing and consistently interpreting these varied statutes.200  The 
ambiguity concerning American nationality highlighted a larger problem of 
incongruous citizenship laws in need of legislative overhaul. 
Congress responded to this turmoil with the Nationality Act of 1940,201 
which, for the first time, established a comprehensive nationality law, 
including the codification of American national status.202  As the hearings 
on the 1940 Nationality Act reveal, the codification of noncitizen national 
status and other related laws reflect Congress’s and political leaders’ desire 
to maintain racial restrictions on citizenship.  In other words, the formal 
inclusion of American nationals in the 1940 Nationality Act is part of an 
untold story about the exclusion of certain racial groups from permanent 
membership in the American polity. 
To more deeply appreciate this story, Part III.A provides background 
context by explaining some of the underlying motivations that led to the 
passage of the Nationality Act of 1940.  Part III.B next analyzes political 
leaders’ efforts to avoid the unintended consequences of opening up 
citizenship to those who had been previously racially excluded from 
citizenship.  Situated within this context, Part III.C maintains that the 
codification of “American national” demonstrates Congress’s intent to deny 
U.S. territories full inclusion into the United States. 
A.  The Need for Comprehensive Nationality Law 
The push for a comprehensive nationality law began in the early 1900s.  
In April of 1906, the Senate passed a joint resolution and appointed the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs “to examine into the subjects of 
citizenship of the United States, expatriation, and protection abroad” and to 
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recommend changes to the law.203  Two months later, the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs expressed the overall motivation for passing a uniform law, 
including the need to “settle some of the embarrassing questions that arise 
in reference to citizenship, expatriation and the protection of American 
citizens abroad.”204  Surprisingly, however, the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs eschewed the opportunity to submit a proposed bill to Congress205 
and instead suggested “a more practical” solution:  the Secretary of State 
would prepare a report and propose legislation.206  In December of 1906, 
the Secretary of State submitted the State Department’s report,207 which 
recommended several changes to citizenship law, including laws providing 
for the revocation of an American woman’s citizenship upon her marriage 
to a foreigner.208 
Congress, however, ended up not passing comprehensive citizenship law.  
Instead, further adding to the list of scattered citizenship statutes, while also 
displaying gendered notions of citizenship, Congress adopted the State 
Department’s recommendation to revoke an American woman’s citizenship 
based on her marriage to a noncitizen.  On March 2, 1907, Congress passed 
the Expatriation Act.209 
Interestingly, the State Department’s report was silent on the issue of 
noncitizen national status, despite its novel invention in the courts and 
glaring ambiguity.  Yet, to the extent that the State Department recognized 
the need to address noncitizen national status, such acknowledgement may 
be gleaned from the appendix to the Committee on Foreign Affairs’s report.  
Specifically, the appendix included a brief discussion of the “inhabitants of 
acquired territories” and gestured toward the administration and judicial 
perception of American nationals as neither citizens nor aliens.210  In 
particular, suggesting that American nationality is similar to U.S. 
citizenship also acquired at birth, the report included noncitizen national 
status on the list of judicial opinions regarding the acquisition of birthright 
citizenship enumerated in chapter 1 of appendix I.211  This list catalogued 
the cases where individuals acquired U.S. citizenship through either birth 
on U.S. soil or because their parents were citizens, suggesting that the State 
Department viewed those included on the list as part of the American 
polity.  In fact, the same section refers to these people as “inhabitants not 
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aliens” and specifically focuses on “Porto Ricans and Filipinos.”212  Yet, 
the 1906 State Department report does not explicitly categorize these 
territorial residents as citizens either, despite their birth on U.S. soil.  
Indeed, the report acknowledged that the Supreme Court had addressed this 
citizenship question in Gonzales but stated that the issue “remains 
undecided.”213  Avoiding the opportunity to clarify this issue, the State 
Department did not recommend a change that would have defined the 
meaning of noncitizen national status. 
The failure to pass a broader, more clear citizenship statute in 1907 did 
not stop Congress from passing further statutes touching on different 
aspects of citizenship.  Adding more confusion to an already capricious set 
of laws, Congress extended citizenship to different groups on an 
inconsistent basis.  In 1917, for example, Congress passed the Jones Act,214 
which conferred citizenship to people in Puerto Rico but did not pass 
similar legislation that would have extended citizenship to the other U.S. 
territorial residents in American Samoa, Guam, and the Philippines.  Then, 
in 1922, Congress passed the Cable Act,215 which partially repealed the 
Expatriation Act and allowed certain American women who had married 
noncitizens to keep their citizenship.216  The law, however, did not include 
those American women who had married noncitizens who were Asian and 
not eligible for citizenship.217  Congress also passed the Indian Citizenship 
Act of 1924,218 which gave statutory citizenship to American Indians and, 
accordingly, addressed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Elk v. Wilkins219 that 
Native Americans did not acquire citizenship at birth under the Citizenship 
Clause.220 
On the judicial end, courts continued to issue conflicting opinions 
regarding racial eligibility for citizenship.  As Professor Ian Haney Lopez 
has explored, courts dealt with multiple cases in which individuals 
unsuccessfully sought to naturalize, contending that they were white.221  
For example, the Supreme Court had held that Japanese were not Caucasian 
and were accordingly ineligible for naturalization in Ozawa v. United 
States222 and four months later, held in United States v. Thind223 that a 
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Punjabi man from the Caucus Mountains was also not white, as popularly 
understood.224  These pronouncements as to who was not white for 
purposes of naturalization, however, failed to provide guidance to lower 
courts, which continued to issue inconsistent rulings on naturalization. 
The impact of these dispersed laws and opinions renewed pleas to collect 
all the citizenship laws in one comprehensive document.  In 1929, the 
Department of State once again studied the country’s citizenship laws and 
submitted a report with recommendations to Congress.225  Again, Congress 
failed to take any action.226  Finally, in 1933, President Roosevelt issued 
Executive Order No. 6115 and directed the “Secretary of State, the Attorney 
General and the Secretary of Labor” to review the nationality laws of the 
United States and to recommend changes.227  The committee, referred to as 
the Committee of Advisers,228 sought to put together laws regarding five 
areas:  acquisition of nationality through naturalization, acquisition of 
nationality at birth, loss of nationality, nationality in outlying possessions of 
the United States, and other miscellaneous areas.229  The three departments 
met several times over the subsequent five years.230 
Finally, on June 1, 1938, the Committee of Advisers submitted a report, 
which “contained about one-thousand-nine-hundred-and-some pages”231 
and included proposed legislation,232 which became H.R. 9980.233  The 
cover letter of the report underscored the administrative efficiency concerns 
of combining all the laws into one main document:  “While the nationality 
laws of nearly all foreign states have in recent years been completely 
revised and codified, the laws of the United States on this subject are found 
scattered among a large number of statutes, and it is sometimes difficult to 
reconcile the provisions of different statutes.”234  Indeed, during one of the 
hearings on H.R. 9980, the State Department representative highlighted that 
the country’s citizenship laws were in “approximately 50 different statutes, 
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some of them running away back to the early days of the Republic, and 
many of them apparently inconsistent.”235  Accordingly, administrative 
officers had difficulty “constru[ing] these laws and say[ing] with any degree 
of confidence whether any individual born under certain circumstances is or 
is not an American national.”236 
Noting that the proposed legislation was arranged in a “systematic and 
orderly form”237 that collated all the dispersed citizenship laws, the 
Committee of Advisers emphasized that the proposed law would promote a 
“fair and equitable government.”238  From the government’s perspective, 
the law would help executive officers carry out their duties, including the 
issuance of U.S. passports, and would provide protection for American 
citizens or nationals.239  It would also address ongoing conflicts regarding 
the status of children born in the U.S. territories who, at times, had been 
viewed as noncitizens at birth.  The representative from the State 
Department, for example, shared an anecdotal story about a person born in 
an “outlying possession.”240  One representative noted that both of the 
child’s parents were U.S. citizens who had lived in the United States for 
most of their lives, yet the citizenship status of the child was unclear.  The 
representative commented that, without doubt, had the child been “born in 
the center of Asia, he would be a citizen.”241  Yet, although the State 
Department would consider the child an American citizen, others had a 
“differ[ent] opinion.”242  This is but one discrete example of a larger set of 
inconsistent opinions about citizenship that those advocating for the passage 
of a comprehensive citizenship statute hoped to address.  By the late 1930s, 
there was consensus on the need to pass a uniform citizenship law. 
B.  Congressional Hearings 
on the Proposed Nationality Act 
Congress held seventeen hearings before it passed the Nationality Act of 
1940 and, in so doing, exposed some of the political leaders’ ideologies 
about which racial groups were deserving of citizenship.  The hearings are 
thus a window through which we can glean Congress’s desire to maintain 
racial restrictions on citizenship, especially when they are viewed in 
conjunction with the fact that citizenship had been made available to select 
racial groups.  In other words, the hearings echoed normative conceptions 
of who was worthy of citizenship and who should belong to the United 
States. 
 
 235. Hearings on H.R. 6127, at 36 (statement of Richard W. Flournoy, Assistant Legal 
Advisor, Department of State). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 31 (statement of Henry B. Hazard, Director of Research, Information, and 
Education, Immigration and Naturalization, Labor Department). 
 238. Id. at 28. 
 239. Id. at 36 (statement of Richard W. Flournoy, Assistant Legal Advisor, Department of 
State). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
2017] AMERICAN NATIONALS & INTERSTITIAL CITIZENSHIP 1703 
At the outset, witnesses at the hearing expressed concerns about diluting 
the value of citizenship because citizens have chosen to live outside the 
United States.  Richard Flournoy, a State Department representative, noted 
this tension: 
[There are] thousands of persons living in foreign countries, usually in the 
foreign countries where they were born, or where their parents were born, 
having all their interests there, and their family connections, and yet they 
are citizens of the United States, and they may call on our Government for 
protection.243 
This statement indicates the State Department’s reluctance to provide 
protection for naturalized citizens who had chosen to disconnect themselves 
from the United States by residing outside the country.  Crucially, 
underlying the State Department’s criticism of providing protection for 
these citizens is the view that they, having chosen to return to their “native 
lands” or “other countries,” were essentially “alien in all their 
characteristics and connections and interests.”244  Yet, despite their 
“foreignness,” these individuals “have the right to enter the United States as 
citizens.”245 
The problem presented by such foreign citizens may be further 
underscored when viewed from the perspective of citizens born in the 
United States who have “alien parents and are taken by their parents to the 
countries from which the parents came and of which they are nationals.”246  
Expressing skepticism about these individuals, Flournoy commented that 
although these children acquired “citizenship under the fourteenth 
amendment . . . they are in no true sense American[s].”247  Flournoy stated 
that, problematically, these citizens may enter the country as citizens and 
“may marry aliens in those countries and have children and those children 
are born citizens.”248  The following exchange between Congressman Rees 
and Flournoy illustrates the foregoing point: 
Mr. Rees:  Pardon me.  Do I understand that a person born of alien 
parentage who goes abroad before he reaches the age of majority, lives in 
a foreign country for many, many years, marries a native of that country, 
can come to the United States and bring his family here? 
Mr. Flournoy:  Yes, sir. 
Mr. Rees:  As a citizen of the United States? 
Mr. Flournoy:  Certainly.  He can live all he pleases in his father’s 
country, and if he does not take the oath of allegiance, if he avoids doing 
that, he remains a citizen of the United States.  Furthermore, if he marries 
a woman of that country he breeds citizens of the United States.  In reality 
they are no more citizens, in character, than all the other inhabitants of 
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that country.  There are not a few of these cases; there are hundreds of 
thousands of them.249 
Indeed, in an exchange with another congressman remarking that it 
“seems to me we are spreading the mantle of protection awfully thin,” 
Flournoy emphasized:  “Not nearly so much as it is now.  There are 
hundreds of thousands of people of the kind I have mentioned.”250  Passage 
of the Nationality Act of 1940 was thus crucial for addressing this gaping 
hole in citizenship law.  Expressing his normative views as to who should 
benefit from this legislation, Representative William R. Poage remarked: 
I know the Constitution forces us to confer certain rights upon people 
born within our territory—but I don’t see why anybody who does not live 
within the United States and who does not have the opportunity to take 
part in American institutions, who does not have opportunity to grow up 
to be what we look upon as an American and to speak the English 
language, who doesn’t have any contact with our form of government—I 
don’t see why that person, no matter what their birth, what their lineage, I 
don’t see why we should confer citizenship upon them, no matter whether 
both their parents are American citizens by statute.251 
To emphasize the point, Mr. Poage stated, “My idea is the minute they, by 
their own voluntary act, get out of the United States, kiss them good-bye 
and tell them ‘Fare thee well, look to somebody else for your 
protection.’”252 
In addition to critiquing the law that allowed birthright citizens to live 
elsewhere while still retaining citizenship rights, the political leaders behind 
this legislation discussed the impact that the proposed legislation would 
have on racial restrictions on naturalization.  For example, Flournoy 
recognized at the outset that the right to naturalize was limited to those of 
the “white race” or persons of “African descent.”253  Expressing 
dissatisfaction, Flournoy commented that what made the law a “poor rule” 
was not because these restrictions were inherently wrong but rather because 
“the intermediate races, men of high class—Hindus, Japanese, Chinese—
cannot get naturalized.”254  Interestingly, although acknowledging the 
unfairness of the law, the State Department believed it lacked authority to 
recommend overturning this rule.255 
Indeed, the hearings displayed congressional leaders’ anxiety about the 
extent to which exceptions to racial exclusion from citizenship had been 
made to members of certain racial groups.  For example, it was revealed 
during the hearings that Congress had passed laws that allowed Filipinos 
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and Japanese to gain citizenship in 1918 and 1935 despite citizenship law’s 
prohibition on naturalization for Asian groups.256  Such exceptional laws 
seemed to pacify speakers at the hearing when Henry Hazard of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service explained that the laws were passed 
because the recipients served in the military.257 
Congressional leaders expressed deep concerns, however, when Hazard 
explained that the proposed legislation would in fact open up citizenship to 
a new racial group:  indigenous peoples from the Western Hemisphere 
would be permitted to apply for naturalization. 
Mr. Rees:  Now, then, tell us in a few words how you are extending it. 
Mr. Hazard:  By making eligible for naturalization descendants of the 
races indigenous to countries of North and South America. 
Mr. Rees:  Who are they who are not at present racially eligible? 
Mr. Hazard:  Well, there would be Peruvian Indians, for instance, the 
Indian races of British Columbia and of South America.258 
Seeking to clarify that the bill would not broadly expand current 
citizenship laws, Rees inquired whether “natives of any country in the 
Western Hemisphere could become citizens who might not otherwise 
become citizens.”259  Hazard responded that this was “not the intention” 
and emphasized that the law would apply to those who were “principally 
Indians.”260  Noting that American Indians in the United States were 
“declared to be citizens by the act of June 2, 1924,” Rees explained that the 
“Indians of British Columbia” and “Indians of South America” should be 
treated similarly.261 
Likewise, Hazard inquired whether the bill would allow Asians or the 
“yellow or brown races” to naturalize.262  The colloquy between the two 
reveals both legal and social conceptions regarding how to categorize 
people based on race and the ideology of the time that privileged some 
racial groups for citizenship. 
Mr. Hazard:  Not of the yellow race.  They are not indigenous—if you 
mean Orientals, and not the brown races, if by that is meant the Malay 
race from either the islands of the Pacific or Asia. 
Mr. Rees:  It is your opinion then—to put it another way, what you really 
intended to do was to include the Indians of the Western Hemisphere? 
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Mr. Hazard:  Because they are the predominant group that would be 
included. 
Mr. Rees:  I am just wondering why you put it that way. . . .  What 
happened to cause you to put that word “indigenous” in here—“people 
that are indigenous”? 
Mr. Hazard:  Unless some words were used which would describe races 
which were native to these countries, it would let in all of the persons of 
races otherwise excluded, and which it was felt were not desirable to 
permit to be naturalized.263 
As the foregoing shows, the speakers understood which racial groups, as 
a normative matter, should be entitled to become citizens and which racial 
groups should continue to be excluded.  Indeed, Rees noted the role that the 
word “indigenous” played in limiting the right to apply for citizenship.  In 
particular, by stating that the term “indigenous” did not include Chinese 
individuals, it ensured that those who were Asian and born in the Western 
Hemisphere would continue to be barred from naturalization. 
Mr. Rees:  They are not natives, though, are they, to the Western 
Hemisphere? 
Mr. Hazard:  Some of them are natives.  I would not say “many,” but 
some are born here.  We have quite a number of Chinese who are natives 
of the United States, born here of Chinese parents who may have come 
from China. 
Mr. Rees:  So you use this word “indigenous” because that differentiates 
from being a native? 
Mr. Hazard:  Yes; because if Hindus, for instance, who have been held to 
be ineligible by the Supreme Court of the United States [under Thind]; 
[and] Japanese, who have also been held to be ineligible by the Supreme 
Court of the United States [under Ozawa]—if they were to go to some 
country of the Western Hemisphere and have children born there—unless 
this term or some term equally descriptive were used, they might become 
naturalized in spite of the fact that persons born in Japan or in British 
India would not be eligible.264 
This statement, similar to others expressed during the hearing, indicates the 
tension that animated the nature of citizenship law at the time.  The various 
dispersed laws had begun to dismantle some of the racial barriers to 
citizenship that both Congress and the Supreme Court had erected since the 
eighteenth century. The Nationality Act of 1940 may thus be viewed, in 
some respects, as Congress’s efforts, despite the constitutional duty to 
create a uniform citizenship law, to ensure that certain racial groups would 
still be denied citizenship. 
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C.  Defining and Codifying Noncitizen National Status 
The foregoing exploration provides valuable context to the codification 
of noncitizen national status.  At the outset, similar to other areas of 
citizenship law, the rules regarding American nationality tended to be 
interpreted inconsistently.  Flournoy, for instance, explained that that when 
a person is born in one of the “outlying possessions, perhaps the Philippine 
Islands” and the father is a “citizen of the United States and had resided in 
this country,” then the child would be considered a citizen.265  As he 
explained, the opposing interpretation would lead to the conclusion that the 
child “would be [an] alien.”266  Emphasizing the problematic nature of such 
a conclusion, Flournoy noted that  
[i]t seems a manifest absurdity that a child should be an alien if born to 
one of our Army officers or civil servants in the Philippine Islands or in 
one of the other outlying unincorporated possessions, yet if the child were 
born in Tibet, he would be a citizen of the United States.267 
Apparently, however, both the Department of Labor and the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service had different views about such a case. 
Such conflicting opinions may perhaps have been influenced by the fact 
that by 1938, U.S. territorial residents had different citizenship and 
nationality status.  By then, Puerto Ricans and Virgin Islanders had 
acquired U.S. citizenship.268  By contrast, American Samoans and 
Guamanians, despite their ongoing quest for citizenship,269 continued to 
have noncitizen national status.  Although Filipinos also retained the status 
of American nationals, Congress had passed the Philippine Independence 
Act,270 which upon the effective date of 1946, would lead to Filipinos 
losing their nationality.271  Notably, nothing in the federal law at that time 
explicitly defined American national status, thus indicating strongly the 
need to clarify this status.  Indeed, the Committee of Advisers272 appointed 
to study the U.S. nationality law acknowledged the importance of resolving 
the political status of U.S. territorial residents when it submitted its report to 
Congress, explaining that “there are no statutory provisions fixing the 
nationality status of the inhabitants of certain outlying possessions of the 
United States, including American Samoa and Guam.”273 
The proposed code, which eventually became the Nationality Act of 
1940, aimed to provide such clarification in a number of ways.  First, it 
included a general definition of the term national.  Indeed, the first 
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provision of the proposed code presented during the hearings tackled this 
issue by stating that national “means a person owing permanent allegiance 
to a state.”274  Explaining that the term national had come into “common 
use in recent years,” the Committee of Advisers stated that it refers to 
“individuals who together compose the people of a sovereign state” 
irrespective of the type of government that the state possesses.275  Where 
the state has a democratic government, the Committee of Advisers’s 
explanatory comments stated that the term “citizen” may also be used 
although the term “national” covers both contexts.276 
In defining the term “national,” the Committee cited international legal 
scholarship that referenced the term.277  In general, these articles 
highlighted differing opinions among legal scholars as to the precise 
definition of “national.”  One commentator, Professor Dudley McGovney, 
contended that the term “nationality” is the “status of a person by virtue of 
which he belongs to a particular state.”278  To McGovney, a national was on 
equal footing as a citizen.279  By contrast, other scholars, although 
recognizing the conventional equation of “citizen” with “national,”280 
maintained that there was a difference between the two.  For instance, 
Professor Charles Mason noted that the “Malays of the Philippine Islands 
and Guam . . . are nationals of the United States,” but they would not be 
considered citizens.281  Another author, James Brown Scott, commented 
that “one may be a national of a country, and subject to its jurisdiction, 
without, however, being a citizen.”282  Scott pointed to Filipinos as an 
illustration of a group “subject to the Government of the United States and 
entitled to its protection abroad, although they are not citizens either in the 
sense of international, or of national law.”283 
The Committee of Advisers also took particular notice of treaties in an 
effort to explain the meaning of the term national.  Specifically, the 
Committee of Advisers referred to the 1921 treaty between Germany and 
the United States in which the term had been employed.284  This treaty, 
which articulated rights and privileges accorded to U.S. citizens and 
nationals, expressed the view that nationals were those “persons owing 
 
 274. Hearings on H.R. 6127, at 411 (sections of the proposed code with explanatory 
comments). 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id.  By contrast, where the “state is represented by a personal sovereign,” the term 
“national” may be used to refer to a “subject.” Id. 
 277. See id. 
 278. Dudley O. McGovney, American Citizenship, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 231 (1911). 
 279. See id. at 236 (contending that the Framers of the Constitution intended to use 
“citizen” as equivalent to “national”). 
 280. See 3 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 372, at 273 (1906) 
(stating that the term “nationality” includes citizens and nationals). 
 281. See CHARLES HARTSHORN MAXSON, CITIZENSHIP 193 (1930). 
 282. James Brown Scott, Nationality:  Jus Soli or Jus Sanguinis, 24 AM. J. INT’L L. 58, 58 
(1930). 
 283. Id. 
 284. See Hearings on H.R. 6127, at 411–12 (sections of the proposed code with 
explanatory comments). 
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permanent allegiance to the respective states.”285  Underscoring the 
enduring allegiance that a national owes the state, the Committee cited 
Carlisle v. United States,286 in which the Supreme Court distinguished 
between persons with “permanent” from those with “temporary” allegiance 
and referred to the people of the Philippines as having permanent allegiance 
to the United States, thus making them nationals.287  Eventually, the 
concept of a person owing allegiance to the United States became the 
quintessential definition of the term “national.” 
Second, the Committee of Advisers clarified that the term “citizen” 
would not be analogous to “national.”  In particular, the proposed definition 
of “national” identified two distinct groups:  proposed section 101(b) stated 
that the term “national of the United States” refers to “(1) a citizen of the 
United States, or (2) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, 
owes permanent allegiance to the United States.”288  Distinguishing 
between the two, the explanatory comments stated that “[t]he corresponding 
term ‘nationality’ . . . is broader in scope than the term ‘citizenship.’”289  
Indeed, the comments clarified that “[a]ll ‘citizens of the United States’ are 
also ‘nationals of the United States,’ but there are national[s] who are not 
citizens of the United States.”290 
The fact that the term “national” encompassed the term “citizen” but not 
vice versa was critical from an international law perspective.  As the 
explanatory comments stated, “from the standpoint of international law 
noncitizen nationals have the same status and are entitled to the same 
protection abroad as nationals who are citizens of the United States.”291  
Thus, outside of the United States, nationals would be treated as if they 
were citizens.  However, “within the territory of the United States under the 
Constitution and laws thereof,”292 nationals would be treated differently 
from, and indeed subordinate to, citizens. 
Critically, the Committee of Advisers understood to whom the term 
“nationals” would be assigned.  Specifically, the Committee of Advisers 
referenced the “inhabitants of the various outlying possessions who owe 
permanent allegiance to the United States but have not the status of citizens 
of the United States.”293  These included the “citizens of the Philippine 
Islands, natives of the Panama Canal Zone, and inhabitants of American 
Samoa and Guam owing permanent allegiance to the United States.”294  In 
 
 285. Id. 
 286. 83 U.S. 147 (1872). 
 287. See id. at 149.  The link between allegiance and national status, of course, was not 
new by 1938, because the Supreme Court’s opinions in both Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 
1 (1904), and Toyota v. United States, 268 U.S. 402 (1925), had highlighted the relationship 
between the two. See supra Part II. 
 288. Hearings on H.R. 6127, at 412 (sections of the proposed code with explanatory 
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 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
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other words, the Committee of Advisers intended that the term “national,” 
but not “citizen,” would be equated with these territorial residents through 
the proposed code presented at the hearing.295 
Third, the Committee of Advisers explained the method through which 
nationality and citizenship may be acquired.  Proposed section 201(a) of the 
proposed code provided that a person is both a citizen and national of the 
United States if she was born in the United States subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof.296  This shows the analogous meaning of citizenship and 
nationality when one is born in the United States.  By contrast, proposed 
section 201(e) conferred citizenship and nationality upon a person born in 
an outlying possession of the United States if at least one parent is a U.S. 
citizen who has resided in the United States.297  This demonstrates that 
what matters in this situation is both birth on U.S. soil and a parent’s 
citizenship.  Finally, proposed section 203(b) provided that a person 
acquires American nationality if born outside of the United States and its 
outlying possessions and both parents are nationals.298  In this way, 
nationality was structured like citizenship, which may be passed down to 
children born abroad. 
The Committee of Advisers’s comments eventually culminated in the 
passage of the Nationality Act of 1940.299  This act codified the concept of 
national status by both defining it and stating the means through which one 
acquires American nationality.300  Specifically, proposed section 101(a) 
defined the status as a “person owing permanent allegiance to a state.”301  It 
then explained that “national of the United States” refers to “(1) a citizen of 
the United States, or (2) a person who, though not a citizen of the United 
States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.”302  To clarify that 
the person holding national status is a member of the United States, 
proposed section 101(b) explicitly stated that the term U.S. national “does 
not include an alien.”303 
Adopting the Committee of Advisers’s recommendations, the Nationality 
Act of 1940 identified the persons who 
shall be nationals, but not citizens, of the United States at birth:  (a) A 
person born in an outlying possession of the United States of parents one 
of whom is a national, but not a citizen, of the United States; (b) A person 
born outside the United States and its outlying possessions of parents both 
of whom are nationals, but not citizens, of the United States, and have 
 
 295. Id.  Indeed, in discussing both terms, the explanatory comments cited Downes v. 
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901), and Gonzales v. 
Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904). 
 296. See Hearings on H.R. 6127, at 419. 
 297. See id. at 423. 
 298. Id. at 430. 
 299. Ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137 (repealed 1952). 
 300. Id. § 204, 54 Stat. at 1139. 
 301. Id. § 101(a), 54 Stat. at 1137. 
 302. Id. § 101(b), 54 Stat. at 1137. 
 303. Id. 
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resided in the United States or one of its outlying possessions prior to the 
birth of such person.304 
In sum, this part sought to explain the legal landscape from which 
American national status emerged and became embedded in citizenship law.  
Congress codified the ambiguous status created by the Supreme Court and, 
in so doing, formalized a secondary political category grounded on racial 
ideology.  When situated against the backdrop of the passage of the 
Nationality Act of 1940, which sought to further limit citizenship to certain 
racial groups, the contemporary meaning of American national status may 
be further understood as part of the legacy of racial exclusion from 
citizenship. 
IV.  INTERSTITIAL CITIZENSHIP 
AND THE UNBUNDLING OF CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS 
Having examined the invention and codification of American nationals, 
this part analyzes how the status shaped and continues to affect the lives of 
Americans nationals, as well as theorizes the legal ramifications of this 
intermediate category.  The history I just narrated reveals the denial of 
citizenship on the basis of race and in furtherance of the American Empire 
and should thus continue to shape examinations of this liminal category.  
Nevertheless, as I contend in this part, it would be useful as a theoretical 
matter to explore the implications of American national status for our 
broader understanding of citizenship.  Accordingly, in this part, I introduce 
two concepts that, going forward, have the potential to reframe our 
conception of citizenship.  The first is the idea that the status of American 
nationals as neither citizens nor aliens led to a unique form of membership 
that I have coined “interstitial citizenship.”  As a descriptive matter, 
interstitial citizenship is an intermediate status in which its holders possess 
some rights that are limited to U.S. citizens, yet are still denied some 
citizenship rights because they are formally noncitizens.  At a minimum, 
interstitial citizenship demonstrates that citizenship is more flexible than the 
traditional binary framing suggests.  More broadly—which leads to the 
second conceptual idea—interstitial citizenship shows that U.S. citizenship 
rights may be disaggregated or unbundled. 
A.  Interstitial Citizenship 
An individual’s rights are defined by their citizenship status.  Part IV.A.1 
lays out the benefits of citizenship and the drawbacks of noncitizenship.  
Then, Part IV.A.2 provides the framework for a new term, which I call 
“interstitial citizenship.” 
 
 304. Id. § 204, 54 Stat. at 1139.  It also includes the following provision:  “(c) A child of 
unknown parentage found in an outlying possession of the United States, until shown not to 
have been born in such outlying possession.” Id. 
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1.  Rights of Citizenship 
Citizenship is valuable because of the package of rights that attend such 
status.305  To be sure, there are certain rights that are enjoyed by all persons 
regardless of citizenship, and thus, rights and privileges need not and should 
not always be dependent on formal political membership.306  Yet, both 
descriptively and normatively, there exists a set of rights that law has 
traditionally determined may be possessed only by citizens:  the right to 
vote in federal, state, and local elections;307 serve on a jury;308 bear arms;309 
enter the United States (either for the first time or reentering upon absence 
from the country);310 and the right to remain, without fear of deportation, in 
the United States.311 
Of these set of rights, there are rights that are particularly significant 
because of their impact on the ability of citizens to travel freely in and out 
of the United States.  First, the right to easily enter the United States is 
accorded to citizens because it enables those who had traveled or resided 
outside the country to come “home.”  This sense of coming home might 
also be felt by those citizens who were born abroad and had yet to reside in 
the United States.  Regardless of the manner in which individuals acquired 
their citizenship or how long they have been away from the United States, 
because they are considered full members of the American polity, they 
cannot be turned away from their home country.312 
To be sure, the right of citizens to enter or return to the United States has 
not been consistently recognized by administrative bodies or the courts.  
For instance, as Professor Erika Lee has pointed out, the Supreme Court 
 
 305. See BOSNIAK, supra note 1, at 20; COHEN, supra note 1, at 6.  It should be noted, 
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THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1989) (discussing equal citizenship based on personhood).  For a 
helpful, albeit simplistic, inventory of citizenship rights, see Citizenship Rights and 
Responsibilities, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/ 
citizenship/learners/citizenship–rights–and–responsibilities (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) 
(laying out the specific rights and responsibilities of citizens) [https://perma.cc/6DRZ-
VAQQ]. 
 306. See KARST, supra note 305, at 3–14.  Furthermore, as Peter Spiro has commented, 
there are in fact “few important rights that hinge on citizenship status.” PETER SPIRO, 
BEYOND CITIZENSHIP:  AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION 83 (2008). 
 307. However, the right to vote was not always limited to citizens.  See Peter Markowitz, 
Undocumented No More:  The Power of State Citizenship, 67 STAN. L. REV. 869, 879 (2015) 
(discussing that, in the early twentieth century, states and territories allowed noncitizens to 
vote in local, state, and federal elections). 
 308. See 18 U.S.C. § 243 (2012) (providing that no citizen shall be excluded from jury 
service because of race). 
 309. See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Aliens with Guns:  Equal Protection, Federal Power, 
and the Second Amendment, 92 IOWA L. REV. 891 (2007) (exploring gun control laws that 
restrict noncitizens’ ability to bear arms). 
 310. See generally Jeffrey Kahn, International Travel and the Constitution, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 271 (2008). 
 311. See Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S. 
Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606 (2011). 
 312. See Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 
373, 375 (2004). 
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recognized in Wong Kim Ark that, though Ark acquired automatic 
citizenship based on his birth in the United States,313 the federal 
government continued to restrict his right to enter the country.314  More 
recently, as Professor Leti Volpp has explored, administrative actions to the 
War on Terror have shown that the executive and judicial branches have not 
consistently protected the right of certain citizens, particularly Muslim 
Americans, to return to the United States.315  Moreover, cases have shown 
that some citizens have also been denied the right to enter the United States 
under suspicions that their claim to citizenship is fraudulent.316  These cases 
demonstrate the pernicious consequences of refusing citizens their right to 
return and the importance of protecting this citizenship right. 
Similarly, courts have held that citizens have the absolute right to remain 
in the United States without being subject to deportation.  As the Supreme 
Court stated: 
The right to remain in the United States, in the enjoyment of all the rights, 
privileges, immunities, and exemptions accorded to the citizens and 
subjects of the most favored nation, is a valuable right, and certainly a 
right which cannot be taken away without taking away the liberty of its 
possessor.317 
Like the right to freely enter the United States, however, the federal 
government has also failed to fully recognize the citizen’s right against 
being deported.  In the 1930s, the federal government engaged in the 
removal of about one million people of Mexican descent who were then 
residing in the United States, where more than sixty percent of those 
removed were Mexican Americans who were U.S. citizens.318  More 
recently, political scientist Jacqueline Stevens examined the extent to which 
immigration authorities unlawfully deported U.S. citizens from the United 
States.319 
By contrast, noncitizens typically do not enjoy the right to freely enter, 
leave and return, or the right to remain in the United States.  Under the 
current Immigration and Nationality Act, noncitizens must establish that 
they are admissible by showing that they meet one of the admissible 
categories under the INA.320  Further, they must demonstrate that they are 
not inadmissible; that there is nothing in the INA that would otherwise 
 
 313. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 679 (1898). 
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 315. See Leti Volpp, Citizenship Undone, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2579, 2583 (2007) 
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 316. See Hernandez v. Cremer, 913 F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 317. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 762 (1893). 
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 319. See Stevens, supra note 311. 
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preclude them from entering.321  In addition, although noncitizens may 
freely leave the United States, they might not be admitted upon their return 
despite their length of residence in the country.322  For those noncitizens 
who have been away from the United States for more than 180 days, they 
will be treated as if they are seeking to enter the country for the first time, 
instead of simply returning home.323  Finally, in general, noncitizens may 
be subject to removal at any time.324  Thus, even long-term lawful 
permanent residents of the United States have been deported despite their 
significant length of residence in the country.325 
2.  American Nationals and Disruption 
of the Citizen/Alien Binary 
The line dividing citizens and noncitizens is not so clear when viewed 
from the perspective of American nationals.  Historically and today, 
noncitizen nationals have freely entered the United States despite their 
alienage.  As persons who pledge allegiance to the United States, American 
nationals are in this way treated as U.S. citizens.326 
This right of entry despite their noncitizenship status underscores the 
unique nature of American nationals and points to a category that I refer to 
as “interstitial citizenship.”  As interstitial citizens, American nationals are 
functionally citizens, for they cannot be barred from crossing the borders of 
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United States). 
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the United States.  This unfettered right to enter the United States was 
particularly important between 1900 and 1952, when various immigration 
laws made different groups of Asians racially inadmissible to the United 
States.327  As discussed above, Congress prohibited persons who were then 
ineligible to become citizens from entering the United States, and by 
barring Japanese from immigrating,328 Congress facilitated the virtual 
exclusion of Asians from the United States. 
American nationality, however, enabled Filipinos and other Pacific 
Islanders who held this status to enter the United States despite their racial 
ineligibility for citizenship.  Thus, beginning in 1898, after the Philippines 
became a U.S. territory, Filipinos began to enter the United States as 
American nationals.329  Travel between the Philippines and the United 
States was considered insular travel, and thus the federal government did 
not keep track of how many nationals entered the United States.  However, 
changes in the population of Filipinos in the United States generally 
demonstrate the role that the status of noncitizen nationals played in 
encouraging migration to this country.  In 1903, approximately 100 
Filipinos arrived in the United States, mainly to study.330  In addition to 
arriving in the United States to study, many Filipinos migrated to work as 
farmers and to join the military.331  In 1910, it was estimated that there were 
fewer than 3,000 Filipinos in the United States.332  By 1920, however, there 
were nearly 27,000 Filipinos, and by 1930, that number grew to 
approximately 110,000.333 
Race continued to play a role in American national status.  The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit highlighted this point in Palo v. 
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Weedin.334  In that case, a Filipino, who was half Chinese, sought to enter 
the United States as a noncitizen national.335  There, the Ninth Circuit noted 
that “we must concede, of course, that a citizen of the Philippine Islands 
owes allegiance to the United States and is not an alien.”336  Yet, the court 
upheld the noncitizen’s exclusion because his father was Chinese, making 
Palo Chinese and thus excludable.337  Despite Palo’s birth in the Philippines 
when it was a U.S. territory, he was denied the status of American 
nationality, as well as the rights attendant to nationality. 
Notwithstanding Palo and the continued racial exclusion of other Asian 
groups, immigration officers admitted thousands of Filipinos to the United 
States.  It was not until the mid-1930s, after Congress passed the Philippine 
Independence Act of 1934338 declaring the Philippines an independent 
country effective 1946, that the number of Filipinos entering the United 
States began to decrease.  The Philippine Independence Act declared that 
Filipinos seeking entry to the United States would be considered 
“aliens.”339  Moreover, Congress provided that the Philippines would be 
subject to a quota of fifty immigrants per year.340  This law had a drastic 
effect on the migration of Filipinos.  In 1931, for instance, there were 
36,535 Filipinos who entered the United States.341  By 1937, the number of 
entrants dwindled to seventy-two.342 
Another right enjoyed by American nationals is the right to remain in the 
United States.  As noted earlier, this right is typically reserved for citizens.  
The absence of this right impacted the more than 2,500,000 noncitizens 
who were deported under President Obama’s administration between 2009 
and 2016.343  By contrast, as interstitial citizens, American nationals have 
the benefit of staying in the United States, even if the federal government 
desired their removal.  For example, in Barber v. Gonzales,344 the Supreme 
Court addressed the issue of whether an American national may be 
deported.  Gonzales was born in the Philippines in 1913 and moved to the 
continental United States in 1930, where he had lived ever since.345  
Gonzales was subsequently convicted of crimes in 1941 and 1950 and, in 
1951, underwent an administrative hearing and was ordered deported to the 
Philippines.346  Specifically, the government sought his deportation for 
 
 334. 8 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1925). 
 335. Id. at 608. 
 336. Id. at 607–08. 
 337. Id. at 608. 
 338. Ch. 84, 48 Stat. 456. 
 339. See id. 
 340. See id. 
 341. See James A. Tyner, The Geopolitics of Eugenics and the Exclusion of Philippine 
Immigrants from the United States, 89 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 54, 70 (1999). 
 342. See id. 
 343. See FY 2016 ICE Immigration Removals, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
https://www.ice.gov/removal–statistics (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/CE6D-
QHBQ]. 
 344. 347 U.S. 637 (1954). 
 345. See id. at 638. 
 346. See id. 
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committing a crime against moral turpitude after making an “entry” in the 
United States.347 
The Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that Gonzales did not 
make an entry such that he was subject to the deportation grounds.  The 
word “entry,” according to the Court, signified “coming from the 
outside.”348  The Court further explained that “in order that there be some 
entry within the meaning of the act there must be an arrival from a foreign 
port or place.”349  The Court then stated that, at the time Gonzales came to 
the continental United States, he was not arriving from a foreign place, but 
instead was “moving from one of our insular possessions to the 
mainland.”350  Thus, although Gonzales was by the 1950s a noncitizen, 
having lost his American nationality status, his prior status insulated him 
from removal. 
The importance of the right not to be removed is particularly significant 
when viewed from the perspective of noncitizens in “liminal” status or 
those who are in “temporally and socially uncertain transitional state of 
partial belonging.”351  As Professor Jennifer Chacon has examined, persons 
in “liminal status” have had to bear social and legal costs as a result of 
having to seek relief, which may always be available.352  Individuals who 
have American nationality, however, are free from the burden of legal, 
social, and psychological costs of removal. 
Another feature of interstitial citizenship is the ability to enjoy not only 
federal rights but also rights guaranteed to U.S. citizens under state law.  At 
one point in U.S. history, one of the rights of citizenship was the right to 
own property as defined by state law.353  Several states passed alien land 
laws to restrict the ability of noncitizens, who were then ineligible for 
naturalization, from owning property.354  These laws were directed 
particularly at Japanese Americans.355 
American nationals, however, were able to acquire property despite their 
alienage.  For example, in Alfafara v. Fross,356 the California Supreme 
Court held that Alfafara, although a noncitizen national, had the right to 
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own land despite the state’s alien land law.357  Alfafara was born in the 
Philippines in 1899 and was thus a noncitizen national of the United 
States.358  In 1929, he moved to California and purchased property in 
1944.359  After selling the property to Alfafara, however, the seller of the 
property refused to convey title, contending that the transaction violated 
California’s alien land law.360  Alfafara, however, maintained that the law 
did not apply to him because he was not an alien.361 
The California Supreme Court agreed with Alfafara.362  The court 
acknowledged at the outset that Filipinos were racially ineligible for 
citizenship.  Citing the Nationality Act of 1940, the court explained that the 
right to naturalize extends only to “white persons, persons of African 
nativity or descent, and descendants of races indigenous to the Western 
Hemisphere.”363 Although the law allowed Filipinos who served in the 
military to apply for naturalization, Alfafara had not served in the military 
and thus was not eligible to naturalize.  Nevertheless, the alien land law did 
not apply to Alfafara because he was not a noncitizen.  Relying on Toyota, 
the court held that Filipinos “are not aliens”364 because they did not owe 
allegiance to any foreign government.365  Indeed, the court underscored that 
Filipinos, since 1898, “have owed allegiance only to the United States.”366 
Notably, the court addressed Alfafara’s status itself and found that he 
was a national.367  The court noted that prior to the Nationality Act of 1940, 
the status of Filipinos was unclear.368  The passage of that law, however, 
clarified the status of Filipinos:  they were thereafter nationals but not 
citizens of the United States who owe “permanent allegiance to the United 
States.”369  Accordingly, the court held that the state’s alien land law could 
not include all categories of noncitizens, “whether alien or national.”370 
Although American nationals enjoy certain rights of citizenship, there is 
no doubt that they continue to be regarded as aliens.  Specifically, the fact 
that they must naturalize to attain citizenship strongly indicates their 
alienage.  The Supreme Court addressed this point in Toyota.371  As 
discussed above, the Court analyzed whether an amendment to the 
naturalization laws, which made Filipinos who served in the military 
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eligible for citizenship, opened up citizenship to a Japanese man.372  The 
Court underscored that the Japanese continued to be excluded from 
citizenship, which was then limited to free white persons and persons of 
African ancestry.373  The Court further explained that Filipinos who did not 
serve in the military were also barred from citizenship.374  Thus, although 
Filipinos could enter the United States and avoid immigration laws that 
applied to Asians, they were treated just like other Asian immigrants by 
being precluded from full membership.  As the Court emphasized, “It has 
long been the national policy to maintain the distinction of color and race” 
in the context of citizenship laws.375 
Second, unlike U.S. citizenship that is acquired at birth, Congress may 
voluntarily take away national status.376  This congressional power was 
highlighted in Rabang v. Boyd.377  Henry Rabang was born in the 
Philippines in 1910.378  A U.S. national at birth, Rabang moved to the 
United States in 1930 and was admitted as a permanent resident.379  
Twenty-one years later, in 1951, Rabang pled guilty to violating federal 
drug laws.380  He was then detained and ordered deported under 
immigration laws that made deportable “any alien” convicted of a federal 
narcotics law.381  The federal government argued that Rabang, although a 
U.S. national at birth, had lost this status when Congress granted full 
independence to the Philippines in 1946.382  Rabang, having entered as a 
national and resided in the United States for twenty-one years, actually 
became a noncitizen four years before he pled guilty to federal drug laws. 
Rabang challenged this application of the immigration laws, contending 
that he was not a noncitizen.383  Specifically, he argued that national status 
“bears such close relationship to the constitutionally secured birthright 
citizenship acquired by the American-born, that its divestiture should rest 
only upon the most explicit expression of congressional intention.”384  The 
Court disagreed, pointing out that when Congress granted “full and 
complete independence” to the Philippines, it also severed the “obligation 
of permanent allegiance owed by Filipinos who were nationals of the 
United States.”385 
Rabang contended, however, that the words of the immigration statute 
required that he had made an “entry” from a foreign country and that, 
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contrarily, when he entered the United States in 1930, the Philippines was 
not then a foreign country.386  Thus, the United States’s power to deport did 
not apply to him because Filipinos had been held to be nonaliens, in light of 
Gonzales.387  Rejecting Rabang’s argument, the Court noted that Rabang 
had made the erroneous assumption that “Congress was without power to 
legislate the exclusion of Filipinos in the same manner as ‘foreigners.’”388  
The Court explained that the power to “acquire territory by treaty” implies 
both the power to govern the territory but also to “prescribe upon what 
terms the United States will receive its inhabitants, and what their status 
should be.”389  Critically, the Court held that Congress not only had the 
power to exclude Filipinos but also chose to exercise such power when it 
passed the Independence Act, which recognizes “citizens of the Philippine 
Islands,” who were not citizens of the United States, “as if they were 
aliens.”390 
The preceding discussion illustrates what it means to be an American 
national:  an interstitial citizen who retains essential qualities of alien status.  
Within the interstices of the line between the citizen and the noncitizen, 
American nationals enjoy some rights of citizenship while at the same time 
experience the disabilities of alienage.  As such, interstitial citizenship has 
challenged the binary construction of citizenship in which certain rights are 
restricted for citizens only. 
B.  Unbundling Citizenship 
The foregoing section provides a descriptive assertion that American 
nationals illuminate the unique category of interstitial citizenship and the 
extent to which it challenges the dichotomous citizen/alien framing of 
citizenship.  This section introduces a second conceptual framework 
emerging from the idea of interstitial citizenship:  rights of citizenship may 
be delinked from formal citizenship.  That is, as a theoretical matter, 
citizenship may be unbundled. 
Professor Elizabeth Cohen, a political scientist, has invoked the idea of 
disaggregating and unbundling rights in her pivotal work on “semi-
citizens.”  She explains at the outset that citizens have “access to an 
intertwining set or ‘braid’ of fundamental civil, political, and social rights, 
along with rights of nationality.”391  She then explains that “[s]emi-citizens 
are accorded only subsets of those rights.”392  Viewing the process of 
unbundling from the perspective of states, Cohen notes that “[b]ecause 
rights create political relationships it is crucial to states that they be able to 
disaggregate bundles of rights.”393  The ability to unbundle the “braid of 
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citizenship rights” facilitates the “shaping and managing” of populations 
with diverse elements that could not be “governed by a single set of 
rules.”394  Notably, using “unbraiding” as a framework, Cohen explains: 
Rights not only come unbraided from each other, but each individual 
strand can fray.  Types of citizenship rights can become disaggregated 
from one another and from their own constituent parts.  This suggests that 
citizenship rights are independent of, rather than contingent upon, each 
other; that is, each right exists because it is valuable in itself, not because 
it makes the exercise of other rights possible.395 
A related framework for examining citizenship is the “bundle of sticks” 
metaphor.  The image of a “bundle of sticks” has long been used as a 
metaphor for the set of property rights that individuals possess where each 
stick is independent of the others within the bundle, and together, they form 
the set of rights that an owner or possessor of property possesses. The 
possessor of property may convey any stick to another person or persons, 
either on a permanent or a temporary basis, which would then give that new 
holder of the stick certain rights to the property.  By unbundling property 
rights, we gain a deeper understanding of the independent power of each 
right and how it relates to other rights.  In his article on the alien land laws, 
the late Professor Keith Aoki, for example, invoked this analogy to explain 
the extent to which these laws that prevented Japanese nationals and 
Japanese Americans from acquiring land meant that they were denied 
different “sticks”—the “right to own” property, which is a “fundamental 
stick in the proverbial ‘bundle of sticks’ U.S. property regime,” as well as 
the “right to rent” and “right to devise.”396 
Although the bundle of rights analogy is conventionally used in property 
law, the concept of “unbundling” has been recently deployed in other areas 
of law, including constitutional law,397 federalism,398 criminal law,399 and 
copyright infringement.400  This body of work has shown that, both 
descriptively and normatively, unbundling certain areas of law may be 
beneficial.  Professor Jessica Bulman-Pozen’s work on federalism, for 
instance, adopts the unbundling framework to argue that federalism may 
best be understood as a flexible concept that is constitutive of different 
autonomous parts, including the right of states to subvert federal laws.401  
Professor John Rappaport similarly adopts the framework in his work on 
the criminal law context by arguing against the guilty plea/jury trial binary 
and contending that defendants can unbundle their rights and trade them 
piecemeal to reduce sentencing exposure.402  He contends that unbundling 
plea bargaining can be beneficial in some instances, such as when a 
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prosecutor is required to offer an unduly low sentence to a defendant who 
has pled guilty.403 
The bundle of sticks approach is useful in the citizenship context as well.  
As American nationals and the rights that attend their interstitial status 
demonstrate, it is not necessarily the case that one has to have formal 
citizenship to enjoy rights that have been conventionally linked with this 
formal status.  The cases discussed in Part IV.A have shown, for example, 
that some American nationals enjoyed the right to enter the United States 
freely even though they remained racially ineligible for naturalization.  In 
addition, American nationals have demonstrated that there are instances 
where they might not be subject to deportation from the United States even 
though they are noncitizens. 
Considering citizenship in this light might not only be descriptively 
useful but also valuable upon exploring the answers to a number of 
normative, doctrinal, and prescriptive questions that the concept raises.  For 
example, what might be considered “sticks” that make up the bundle of 
citizenship?  Indeed, what should be considered the “core” rights of 
citizenship?  May each stick be conveyed or assigned to other citizens and 
noncitizens?  If so, should there be term limitations on the conveyance as in 
a lease?  Is the right inheritable?  Can the government take away one stick, 
but not others?  If it does, might it be considered a taking?  By addressing 
these questions, we gain an appreciation for the individual value or worth of 
each stick within the bundle. 
Unbundling citizenship has potential usefulness in debates surrounding 
immigration reform.  Comprehensive immigration reform has been stalled 
in part because of legislators’ resistance to creating a path to citizenship for 
the eleven million undocumented immigrants in the United States.404  For 
some, providing undocumented immigrants with a guaranteed path to 
citizenship is akin to awarding those individuals who intentionally violated 
the rule of law.  A number of undocumented immigrants have expressed 
that, for them, citizenship is not necessarily what they desire.405  Instead, 
they want to be able to live and work in the United States and exit and enter 
the country without fear of removal.406  Yet, advocates have countered that 
they would not support the passage of a new immigration law if it failed to 
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include some process for undocumented immigrants to acquire lawful status 
or citizenship.  Ultimately, the tension between these two positions led, in 
part, to the failure to pass immigration reform. 
The idea of the divisibility of citizenship rights may be particularly useful 
for the continuing discussions around this type of reform assuming, of 
course, that the current administration and Congress are willing to address 
the issue.  Particularly, it may be beneficial to consider discussions 
centering on a type of status involving certain rights of citizenship that 
immigrants consider particularly valuable, such as the right to freely enter 
the United States and the right not to be deported.  This is not to suggest 
that a path to citizenship need not be part of the discussion.  To the 
contrary, it should, particularly in light of the history I explained above—
but so should other possible statuses that create an intermediary category 
that would allow some noncitizens to enjoy certain rights of citizenship.  To 
be clear, any intermediate category that noncitizens might desire should be 
such that noncitizens may later opt for full citizenship.  In other words, the 
choice to become a U.S. citizen must remain available. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the conventional understanding of the Citizenship Clause,407 a 
person automatically acquires U.S. citizenship when she is born on U.S. 
soil.408  Ongoing discussions about “anchor babies”409 and proposals to 
deny birthright citizenship to children who were born in the United States 
and whose parents are undocumented410 animate this popular conception of 
birthright citizenship law.  Yet, it is not always the case that birth on U.S. 
soil leads to U.S. citizenship.  As this Article has contended, there is 
another, notably inferior, status acquired at birth:  noncitizen national status.  
This Article aimed to provide a fuller legal historical account of how the 
American national status came to be part of federal citizenship law.  But, it 
has also examined the broader implications of this status for the way in 
which we understand both citizenship and immigration law.  First, it argued 
that the noncitizen national challenges the conception of a binary 
citizen/noncitizen framing of citizenship.  Second, it has underscored the 
extent to which American national status constituted a form of interstitial 
citizenship or membership.  This intermediate category enabled American 
nationals to navigate racially restrictive immigration laws, property, and 
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naturalization laws.  In so doing, noncitizen nationals reveal that citizenship 
is more fluid than previously thought and help to illustrate the argument 
that citizenship rights may be unbundled.  Third, this Article has suggested 
the potential application of the concept of unbundling citizenship to 
immigration reform.  In sum, by exploring both the legal history and 
contemporary significance of American nationals, this Article sought to 
deepen our conceptions of why citizenship both descriptively and 
normatively matters. 
